Public Bill Committee

[Hugh Bayley in the Chair]

Clause 89

Extent

Amendment proposed (this day): 290, in clause 89, page 103, line 2, at end insert
(ba) sections [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence] to [Interpretation] and Schedule [Injunctions: powers to remand],.(Mr. Coaker.)

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Hugh Bayley: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following: Government new clause 11Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence
(1) A court may grant an injunction under this section if two conditions are met.
(2) The first condition is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has engaged in, or has encouraged or assisted, gang-related violence.
(3) The second condition is that the court thinks it is necessary to grant the injunction for either or both of the following purposes
(a) to prevent the respondent from engaging in, or encouraging or assisting, gang-related violence;
(b) to protect the respondent from gang-related violence.
(4) An injunction under this section may (for either or both of those purposes)
(a) prohibit the respondent from doing anything described in the injunction;
(b) require the respondent to do anything described in the injunction.
(5) In this section gang-related violence means violence or a threat of violence which occurs in the course of the activities of a gang or is otherwise related to such activities..
Amendment (a) to new clause 11, at end insert
(6) In this section gang shall mean a group of people who see themselves or are seen by others as a discernable group and exhibit any one or more of the following factors
(a) engaging in criminal activity;
(b) identifying with a particular geographical area;
(c) having some form of identifying organisational feature;
(d) being in conflict with other similar gangs..
Government new clause 12Contents of injunctions.
Government new clause 13Contents of injunctions: supplemental.
Government new clause 14Applications for injunctions under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence].
Government new clause 15Consultation by applicants for injunctions
(1) Before applying for an injunction under section [Applications for injunctions under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence]], the applicant must comply with the consultation requirement.
(2) In the case of an application by a chief officer of police, the consultation requirement is that the chief officer (the applicant chief officer) must consult
(a) any local authority that the applicant chief officer considers it would be appropriate to consult, and
(b) any other chief officer of police whom the applicant chief officer considers it would be appropriate to consult.
(3) In the case of an application by the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force, the consultation requirement is that the constable must consult
(a) any local authority that the constable considers it would be appropriate to consult, and
(b) any chief officer of police whom the constable considers it would be appropriate to consult.
(4) In the case of an application by a local authority, the consultation requirement is that the local authority (the applicant local authority) must consult
(a) any chief officer of police whom the applicant local authority considers it would be appropriate to consult, and
(b) any other local authority that the applicant local authority considers it would be appropriate to consult..
Amendment (a) to new clause 15, after subsection (2)(b) insert
(c) any primary care trust, mental health trust or other NHS authority that the applicant chief officer considers would be appropriate to consult; and
(d) any youth offending team, local probation service or office of the National Offender Management Service that the applicant chief officer considers would be appropriate to consult..
Amendment (b) to new clause 15, after subsection (3)(b) insert
(c) any primary care trust, mental health trust or other NHS authority that the constable considers would be appropriate to consult; and
(d) any youth offending team, local probation service or office of the National Offender Management Service that the constable considers would be appropriate to consult..
Amendment (c) to new clause 15, after subsection (4)(b) insert
(c) any primary care trust, mental health trust or other NHS authority that the applicant local authority considers would be appropriate to consult; and
(d) any youth offending team, local probation service or office of the National Offender Management Service that the applicant local authority considers would be appropriate to consult..
Government new clause 16Applications without notice.
Government new clause 17Interim injunctions: adjournment of on notice hearing.
Government new clause 18Interim injunctions: adjournment of without notice hearing.
Government new clause 19Variation or discharge of injunctions.
Government new clause 20Arrest without warrant.
Government new clause 21Issue of warrant of arrest.
Government new clause 22Remand for medical examination and report.
Government new clause 23Further provision about remands.
Government new clause 24Guidance.
Government new clause 25Supplemental.
Government new clause 26Interpretation.
New schedule 2Injunctions: Powers to Remand.

Paul Holmes: To recap, the Minister had clarified the intention of the new clauses. One clarification, which dealt with a number of the issues that organisations such as Justice and Liberty have raised about youth courts and so on, was that the new clauses will not, by and large, or at all, apply to under-18s. However, the Minister also put great emphasis on the fact that one of the reasons for introducing the new clauses on gangs was the involvement of 14, 15 and 16-year-olds in stabbings. That is a dichotomy that will require further exploration when he sums up.
It is also an issue that, if the new clauses do not apply, by and large, to under-18s because they would not be able to afford the fine imposed for a breach of the injunction, some 16 to 18-year-olds do of course work and earn money, and so could pay the fine. Will the clauses therefore apply to a few under-18s who do work and are able to afford the fine, or will they not apply to any under-18s? Either way, there is much confusion, so surely the Bill should address an age limit, if there is to be one. I hope that the Minister will discuss that in his closing comments.
We also discussed the fact that the new clauses do not offer a definition of a gang. In his opening comments, the Minister went to great lengths to say that the provisions will not apply to a group of hoodies on a street corner or to football fans wearing scarves. Can we be content with such a simple explanation? We all know of examples of legislation being passed for one purpose, but allowing mission creep to take place, because the police will use whatever powers they have in certain situations. Terrorism legislation was used to arrest a heckler at a Labour party conference, for example, as well as to stop legitimate peaceful protesters at arms fairs in London.
Furthermore, on 15 November 2008, section 27 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 was used against 80 Stoke City fans, so the Ministers claim that the new clauses do not apply to football supporters is relevant here. The fans stopped at a pub on their way to a match. They were being perfectly peaceful and the publican made no complaint about their behaviour. The police, however, used the 2006 Act to round them up and detain them for a while, before sending them 40 miles back to Stoke on a coach. They missed the match, had no toilet facilities and were told to pee into cups, which spilled all over the floor of the coach. The treatment of those fans was unacceptable; they had not committed a violent offence and the publican had not complained about them, and it would appear that the legislation was grossly misused.
There are other examples that could be highlighted illustrating the same point regarding legislation being misused for one purpose when it was clearly intended for another. As there is no definition of a gang in the new clauses, does that not leave open the possibility that the legislation might be misused for purposes for which the Minister says that it is not intended? It could be used against football fans, for example, or gangs of hoodies on street corners and so on, even though I accept the Ministers explanation that the intent of the new clauses is, essentially, to target hard-core gangs involved in major violence and serious organised activity. There has been much reference to the dangers of such gangs, but it should be put on recordas it has been alreadythat the issue does not apply to most of the country. However, it is a major problem in the areas to which it does apply.
In my 22 years of teaching, I never came across a gang culture impinging on school life. I have some experience of schools in Sheffieldnot much, even though I went to school thereand did some teaching practice near Barnsley, but most of my teaching was in Derbyshire. Yet I recently visited a school in an area of London with a strong gang culture. That culture sometimes impinges on school life there, although by and large the school is a haven of safety within the community. There was just one incident there recently. Last summer, a gang member inflicted serious harm on another pupil who was a member of a rival gang with a metal barthe kind that has dumb-bell weights at the endsand was jailed. Nobody disputes that in some of our inner cities there are serious gang issues such as those that the Minister has described, but that is not the experience of the vast majority of the population in the UK.
The Minster has not explained clearly enough why the Government feel that the existing laws are inadequate, but I hope that he will. Those were precisely the grounds on which the Court of Appeal rejected the Birmingham case. It said that the available evidence was too flimsy to lead to the injunction that had been issued. The ruling stated that the legislation on antisocial behaviour orders was perfectly adequate to deal with the matter. Clearly, the Government do not agree with that, because they are introducing these strong clauses on a new offence that could be used in such situations. However, the Court of Appeal said that there was plenty of legislation that could have been used and that the evidence was too flimsy. Are the Government introducing the new clauses because they want a lower burden of proof? For an ASBO, the criminal burden of proofthat it is beyond reasonable doubt that a person has acted antisociallyis needed. In the Shafi and Ellis case, the Court of Appeal made it clear that, given the seriousness of the matter, the same standard of evidencethe criminal burden of proof involving the matter being beyond reasonable doubtshould be applied. The new clauses would create a new civil order with a lower applicable standard of proof: proof on the balance of probabilities. Is the real reason behind the clauses to allow a lower burden of proof and make it easier to get an injunction, or, under existing law, an ASBO? The Court of Appeal thought that the ASBO was perfectly adequate in that situation.
The proposals affect the liberty of the person. They affect the right of association and expression and freedom of movement, and they introduce a concept of criminality without trial and with a lower burden of proof. That is contrary to the tenor of English law over the eight centuries since Magna Carta. If the Government take that serious step they will have a lot more explaining to do to convince both the House and the other place.
As well as introducing a lower standard of proof for the new offence, the proposals also move what is basically an ASBO principle on from prohibiting someone from doing something to requiring that they do things as well. In that sense it is almost a control order, and we all know the controversy that surrounds those. The Government have said repeatedly that control orders were temporary measures, but they have renewed them two or three times. Those measures are very controversial and we will look at them again soon in the main Chamber. It seems as though we are almost turning an ASBO into a control order with the new clauses, and that raises serious concerns that we will need to discuss at much greater length in both Chambers.
I would like the Minister, in summing up, to answer three questions. Why are the current measures not adequate, even though the Court of Appeal specifically stated that they were, which is why it rejected the situation in Birmingham? The Minister discussed the problems with having a definition of a gang and said that he would look again at the proposals for one, but without a definition how do we stop major mission creep or the abuse of powers that we see with other legislation relating to violent disorder and the prevention of terrorism? Why should we introduce a low burden of proof when an injunction would have such a major impact on a persons basic civil liberties?

Vernon Coaker: Welcome, Mr. Bayley, to the Committees final sitting, and the conclusion of our deliberations on the Bill. The debate on gangs has been interesting and good, and I make no apology for repeating a couple of points before turning to the specific issues that have been raised. In these provisions, we are wrestling with what to do about a small number of individuals who are extremely violent and dangerous, and I know that every member of the Committee accepts that that is the case. Not only are those individuals violent and dangerous, but they terrorise communities. As I have said on numerous occasions, the criminal route, where possible, is the preferred option. Leaving aside the age issue, we would of course prefer it if criminal evidence was gathered so that those people could be brought before the criminal courts and prosecuted.
However, the hon. Members for Chesterfield and for Hornchurch know as well as I do that gathering that evidence in some parts of some communities is virtually impossible. What should we do about that? Should we shrug our shoulders and say, There is nothing that we can do about that, so we will just let those people act with impunity.? I know that that is not what the hon. Member for Chesterfield is suggesting we do, but we cannot even prove that they threaten and terrorise people, because they intimidate the witnesses, who are so frightened that they will not come forward. That is why we have seen changes in the criminal justice system to take witness protection measures and use video links or screens around a witness box, which are also serious matters.
The alternative to taking such measures is that we would just let people get away with it, which is not acceptable, so the criminal justice system has adapted witness protection measures and various other measures. We are trying to deal with all the things that the hon. Members for Chesterfield and for Hornchurch have raised. Established organised gangs operate on territory with the use of colours to terrorise and threaten people, and they operate in a way that makes it impossible to gather evidence to do anything about it.
Birmingham used those injunctions to try to tackle the problem and the figures showed a dropincidentally, the hon. Member for Chesterfield will know that the relevant cabinet member in Birmingham is a Liberal Democrat. I know that there are issues relating to human rights and the proper use of powers, but I would have thought that residents in Birmingham and across the country would look at that and say, That is fantastic. It may have infringed the privacy and human rights of the individual subject to the injunction, but the human rights of countless numbers of individuals are enhanced by the fact that someone who had terrorised the community was no longer able to do so.
The hon. Member for Chesterfield asked why the existing powers were not adequate, which I will come to in a moment, but all those powers existed in Birmingham and across the country, and it was still not possible to tackle effectively some of the most violent individuals. We looked at what happened in Birmingham, we saw that there was a public policy response which made a difference, and we thought we should adapt it, particularly following the court judgment.

Paul Holmes: The Court of Appeal said:
In reaching these conclusions we do not wish to minimise in any way the problems identified by the council. However, we are confident that the courts have ample powers to deal with them.
The Minister says he will return to that. If the Minister convinces us that the current powers are not satisfactorywhich is why this is neededis he saying that on the basis of council and police supposition or belief, and without the evidence to prove it, there should be the ultimate power under these injunctions to put three requirements on an individual? The individual would spend eight hours at a place of work or education; eight hours of leisure at a particular place and eight hours of sleep at a particular place. The whole 24 hours and seven days a week of someones existence would be controlled without evidence presented to justify it. Is that what the Minister is saying?

Vernon Coaker: No, I am not saying that. Let me give some evidence of what Birmingham was able to do with the use of injunctions that it was not able to do with its existing powers. Birmingham obtained about 30 injunctions between August and the end of December 2007, with a co-ordinated approach, intensive policing, deployment of a mediation service and so on. I accept that cause and effect may not have been the sole reasonit may not have been just the use of injunctions that brought these changes about. There may have been other factors but it is still pretty stark. In the Handsworth, Lozells, and Newtown area of the city, the number of robberies in the four months prior to the injunctions averaged 55 per month, compared with 33 per month while injunctions were in place. After injunctions were removed, the figure rose again to 48. In the Aston and Nechells area, there was an average of 11 firearms incidents in the four months preceding the orders, compared with four for the period in which the orders were in place. After the court judgment, the figure rose to nine in March. In the city centre, firearms usage dropped from eight incidents in July 2007 to one in September 2007. After injunctions were removed, there was a rise to a peak of nine incidents in May 2008.
Chief Superintendent Paul Scarrott, who is in charge of the basic command unit where most of the gang-related activity is focused, went on record to attest to the value of injunctions:
The influence injunctions have on an individual gang members behaviour and the gang as a whole is substantial. Many have expressed their fear of having prohibitions placed on their activities and the degree of disruption to their established methods of operation. Both the exclusion and non-association clauses of the injunctions were instrumental in limiting and controlling their criminal activity.
Those figures are astonishing. If they could be replicated through the use of injunctions across the rest of the country, I do not think there would be a community that would object, saying the injunctions are an infringement of civil liberties and the judicial practice of this country. People would see reductions in harm, firearms, threats and intimidation while their human rights would be enhanced, such as their ability to go out at night and wander about their community without being threatened or terrorised. They would not be saying this is a difficult debate about injunctions; they would be saying to Parliament, Get on with it!

Paul Holmes: I see the point the Minister is making. I could give an example from about 10 years ago, before I was an MP, when there was a series of car break-ins on the street where I live in Chesterfield. In the course of a week, there were about seven, and my car was broken into on Monday and on Friday. The police knew who was doing ithe had just come out of prison and was living in a hostel about two streets away. They could, in theory, have locked him up and thrown away the key, but they have to have evidence before they take action. In many cases, the police could intern the usual suspectswe would get some innocent ones, but we would also get some guilty ones and depress the criminal figures. Surely, though, the police have to have some evidence.
Internment in Northern Ireland was a disaster, because many extraneous and innocent people were interned. The logic of the Ministers argument is that if the police suspect that 20, 30 or 40 people are at the core of it, they will slap injunctions on them. If the police are saying, 24 hours later this is where you must be, that is almost a form of internment. Surely, there has to be some level of acceptable evidence before they can do that. What is that level?

Vernon Coaker: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman has made a comparison with internment. I am sure that, on reflection, he will think that that is not quite the case. I understand the point he is makingand I will answer the point about evidence in a momentbut with internment, people were rounded up and put in places such as Long Kesh just on the basis of intelligence with no judicial oversight. With respect to the hon. Gentleman, he might, on reflection, think that that is not the best analogy.

Paul Holmes: I gave two examples. Internment was one example where, on no evidence other than police suspicion or very flimsy evidencesometimes 30 years out of datethey rounded up the usual suspects. I gave the example of the police in Chesterfield and a spate of car thefts 10 years ago in my street. The police said that they knew who was doing it, but they did not have the evidence. However, the principle is the level of evidence required, and the Minister has just said that there would have to be some evidence for an injunction. What is the acceptable level of evidence? The whole point of the provisions is to drop that level dramatically from a criminal standard to a civil standard and that is a very serious point. What is the level of evidence, other than the suspicion of the council or the police, to say that these are the guilty people?

Vernon Coaker: As the hon. Gentleman knows, with respect to the two conditions, the evidence is the balance of probability, which is the civil standard. Since we are now quoting case law, I will quote another case back at him, but there are two conditions, one of which is the balance of probability. It is not just a case of police officers saying thatthe judgment has to be made by a court. Once it is granted by the court, there is an opportunity of appeal to the High Court, as there always is. If the order is granted, the ability to vary the order, or to have it discharged, remains available both to the respondent and to the applicant.
It is important to look at the ASBO-civil order comparison. If someone receives an ASBO and it is breached, it is a criminal offence. It is not a criminal offence to breach a civil orderit is still a civil offence tried in a civil court and, significantly, there is no criminal record, because it is a civil offence. There is therefore a significant difference. As for the standard of proof, the breach has to be to the criminal standardbeyond reasonable doubt. There are two conditions: a preventive civil orderI know the hon. Member for Chesterfield does not agree with that, but that is the argument that we makeand the balance of probability. However, we recognise the seriousness the situation if there is a breach, even though that is not a criminal offence, by moving to the standard of proof, which is beyond reasonable doubt.
Paul Holmesrose

Vernon Coaker: If the hon. Gentleman is going to quote McCann at me, I will come back to that in a little bit.

Paul Holmes: Is there a contradiction in what the Minister has just said? On the one hand, he says that those are more serious offences than ASBOs would normally be used forASBOs are used for relatively low-level disorder on the streets and street cornersbecause we are talking about serious gangs, crimes and knifings. The Minister says that the same standards applied to ASBOs apply here, but to a much more serious situation. If we are making the comparison with ASBOs, the Minister should explain why we need these new clauses and injunctions, with a different set of evidence criteria. Why are we not using the existing legislation, as the Court of Appeal says that all the existing legislation on ASBOs is more than adequate to deal with this matter? It said that it was convinced that that legislation was perfectly adequate.

Vernon Coaker: I will come on to the issue of the standard of proof. There is clearly a difference of opinion. I will not read out the Birmingham statistics again, but all the powers to which the hon. Gentleman referred, including ASBOs, were available to the police, to the council in Birmingham and to others. However, when they used the power of injunction, there was a dramatic change.
I often say this, and it is not meant as a disrespectful point to the hon. Member for Hornchurch or anyone else, but if the hon. Gentleman was in my shoes and he was presented with that evidence on that particular public policy, he would see that it was an innovative and exciting initiative by Birmingham city council. It had an effect, and I think that it would have a pretty good effect on the rest of the country. It would save lives, and it would prevent people from getting into trouble in the first place.
We have tried to include judicial oversight in this measure, which is why I took exception to the reference to internment. All the way through the Billnot just in these provisions but in every clauseI have tried to ensure that there is judicial oversight. There is sometimes an argument about what the level of that oversight should be. However, I am very conscious of the need for judicial oversight and of the whole human rights debate; I try to include an awareness of those issues in everything that we do. Nevertheless, the change in Birmingham was dramatic. There are people walking the streets of Birmingham now who would either be dead or in prison but for the use of that injunction.

Sally Keeble: Does my hon. Friend agree that, in this instance, what he is doing is identifying non-criminal behaviour to identify patterns of behaviour that might lead to serious violence, whereas for the ASBO there is an unacceptable level of antisocial behaviour already there? It is quite appropriate that we should have different levels of proof and different processes. If people engaged in the gang-related violence, they would be prosecuted for the offence, whether it was a stabbing or whatever.

Vernon Coaker: My hon. Friend is right to point out that, essentially, we use the appropriate tool for the particular action that we see in the community. The ASBOs that were available simply were not having the impact in Birmingham that the injunctions were having. It is a sign of my age, but I think that if people saw that we were not going to use those injunctions, they would say, I cant believe it. I shall leave it at that.

Paul Holmes: This is my final last intervention, because otherwise we will start to go round in circles. I cannot give the exact quote, because I have given it to the Hansard reporter, but the Court of Appeal said that the evidence that was presented was too flimsy to justify an injunction, which has serious implications.
Anybody in authority, such as a teacherI have been a teacher myselfor a policeman on the street can always say, Oh well, if I could just act outside the law, I could round up anybody, as I know who the suspects are. They would always want to push that, in order to do the job. The point of making the law in Parliament is to set the boundaries within which that process operates. That is what we are asking for. If the Court of Appeal felt that the evidence was too flimsy for such a serious injunction, how does the Minister defend changing the law to allow that relatively flimsy evidence to lead to such serious injunctions?

Vernon Coaker: I am not trying to allow flimsy evidence to justify giving somebody an injunction under this provision and under the new clauses. I am trying to clarify matters and to give to courts the power to give an injunction to someone where it is demonstrated to the satisfaction of a court that they have been involved in gang-related violence.
The hon. Gentleman will see that the judgment that he quoted from the Court of Appeal said that the injunction was being used to tackle antisocial behaviour, rather than violent behaviour. Antisocial behaviour orders tackle antisocial behaviour, but injunctions can be used to tackle violent behaviour. Through the new clauses, we are trying to ensure that it is clear that the courts can impose injunctions on individuals involved in gang-related violence. If the hon. Gentleman rereads the court judgment on Shafi and Ellis, he will see that it says that an injunction was used to tackle antisocial behaviour, not violence.

James Brokenshire: In that judgment, the Master of the Rolls and Lord Justice Rix said:
Parliament has recently legislated to restrain anti-social behaviour in a particular way and subject to particular safeguards.
They were suggesting that Parliament had decided that that was the most appropriate way forward. The question for the Minister and for the Committee is: are we satisfied that the tools available to local authorities and the police, subject to appropriate safeguards, are sufficient and appropriate? I do not think that the Court was deciding whether it felt that they were sufficient. As that quote indicates, it is a matter for Parliament to consider whether the toolsASBOs, section 222 injunctions or otherwiseare sufficient to deal with the problems that, sadly, we face.

Vernon Coaker: The last two or three contributions have helped to clarify the matter. Essentially, it is about injunctions being used to tackle antisocial behaviour, rather then violent behaviour, and the need for Parliament to make it clear that the courts can impose injunctions to tackle gang-related violent behaviour, which is why we introduced the provision.

Nadine Dorries: Sometimes it is difficult to understand the situations within which the measure would be warranted that the police have to deal with. On Monday in Liverpool, a gang of boys circled the car of a district nurse who was trying to get into somebodys house to do a dressing. They all had knives and made it clear that they were not going to allow her to leave her car, which they smashed and scratched when she called the police on her mobile phone. As the hon. Member for Northampton, North said, that shows a pattern of gang-type behaviour that, next time, could be far worse. It is difficult for us to say what kind of evidence would demonstrate when those patterns of gang-related behaviour, which start at 12 and 13 years old, develop into something more serious. A measure such as this would stop that in its tracks early on.

Vernon Coaker: That is helpful. We are giving the courts the power to impose injunctions where there is gang-related violence. I shall come back to under-18s, but I want to move on to general points and put something specific on the record.
I have said to the hon. Member for Hornchurch, but would like to reiterate for the hon. Member for Chesterfield, that there is an issue with the definition of gangs, and I will reflect on that to see whether we can properly incorporate one into the Bill, if possible. There are different definitions. Manchester defines gangs as
A group of three or more people who have a distinct identity...and commit general criminal and anti-social behaviour as part of that identity. This group uses (or is reasonably suspected of using) firearms, or the threat of firearms.
The London definition is:
Street gangs are relatively durable, street-based groups who see themselves and are seen by others as a group for crime and violence which are essential to group practice and solidarity.
I was not trying to make a political point but, again, the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) listed the four conditions that the hon. Member for Hornchurch has put forward, but said that they all had to be satisfied for that behaviour to be gang-related, but the hon. Gentlemans amendment requires any of those conditions to be met. Clearly, we have to have more in the Bill about the definition of a gang, but it is not easy. We do not want it to mean, as, I think, Liberty said, just a group of hoodiesof course not. Violent behaviour and the other things that we have talked about have to be involved. I will reflect upon it. I hope that that has answered the general point about definitions.
As I have said to the hon. Gentleman, although I will not accept his amendment, I will look at this because I know he is trying to see how we can deal with that, what sort of definition we come up with and what we need to put in the Bill. Similarly, I accept that there is need for broader consultation. I need to see whether there are other people we should consult too, such as employers.
New clause 24 talks about the code of practice. There is a need to toughen it up. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North made an important point about the code of practice. We will need to publish a draft and put it before Parliament so it can be discussed. The code of practice will be essential for the operation of these powers. Rather than just being published by the Secretary of State, it needs greater parliamentary scrutiny.
On the under-18s point, I am sorry if I am not making myself very clear. I am not trying to confuse anybody. I am laying out what the situation is. The injunctions can be used for under-18s, but it is unlikely that they would be used in practice because they are not enforceable. I take the point that some people would have an income. The vast majority of people whom these injunctions are designed to catch may have a source of income, but it is not likely to be legitimate. A court would have to take that into account. The breach would be a contempt of court because it is a civil offence. It is not possible to send anyone who is under 18 to prison or a youth offender institution for a civil contempt of court, so there is no enforceability of the injunction.
What I have saidand nobody, including the hon. Member for Chesterfield, disagreedis that the public will point to the 13, 14 or 15-year-olds who are out there. The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire described how her constituent was surrounded by kids with knives. I do not know whether they were 13, 14 or 15. People will point out that the injunctions are about trying to tackle serious gun-related violence but do not or are unlikely to apply to under-18s. They will ask what on earth we are doing when many people of 14, 15 or 16 are likely to be those to whom such an injunction would apply.
There is a public policy gap. I have asked my officials to work with other officials across Government to see whether there is something proportionate that takes into account all of the legitimate concerns everybody will have and to try to find a way forward. I have also said that I will talk to and involve other Members on this because it is so important. I know the difficulty of trying to get it through. Without some sort of consensus it will not go through Parliament. That will leave us with the situation where the public will ask why we are not dealing with some of the most serious violent individuals in our communities. That is all that I have said. I do not know what the answer will be, but it would be remiss and an abrogation of my responsibility to say that I will not even try to look at it when I know it is a problem.
I know that this will create problems. I know that all sorts of issues will arise from it. But that is the price that has to be paid for trying to do the right thing. That is what I will do. Whether it is possible, I do not know. But that is what I will do. In the end, if we can deliver something for under-18s, it will save lives and it will prevent harm in communities.
I was asked whether these injunctions would stand alone or be alongside criminal convictions. These are stand-alone injunctions. They cannot be imposed upon conviction. Our preference is always to engage the criminal justice system where there is sufficient evidence of a criminal offence. That is why these injunctions are not punitive. They are imposed as a sanction for bad behaviour. They are imposed as a preventive measure to prevent gang-related violence. As I have said, the injunctions will not be imposed to punish someone for what they have done, but to prevent future gang-related violence. That is why the two stages of the injunction test are distinct. Past behaviour must be proved, but that is not enough for a court to grant the injunction. If the court is not satisfied that an injunction is necessary to prevent gang-related violence, an injunction will not be granted, notwithstanding any past behaviour. For that reason, we can confidently say that the injunctions are preventive measures.
The hon. Member for Chesterfield mentioned the House of Lords decision in McCann, in which it said that an enhanced civil standard of proof akin to the criminal standard should apply when granting an ASBO. He will also know of when, in the case of re. Ba childthat House considered the question of the sliding scale of the standard of proof. The ruling was clear that there is only one civil standard of proofthe balance of probabilities. That is the standard for the injunctions, as new clause 11 makes clear. These injunctions are civil tools made in the civil courts, and breach of them is contempt of court.

James Brokenshire: If I understand correctly, the Minister seeks to distinguish the orders from the McCann judgment, which I think was my point to him when asking if that was his intention. If he reflects on the Shafi and Ellis decision, he will note that the court suggested that the McCann standard would be applicable in those sorts of injunctions. I wish, therefore, to understand what he is saying about these orders. Does he see the standard here as purely the balance of probabilities, and not the sliding scale that could equate to the criminal standard as was suggested in McCann in relation to ASBOs, and which seemed to be extended to section 222 injunctions in the context of the judgment that gave rise to this proposal?

Vernon Coaker: Yes, we do see the standard here as consistent with the civil standard of the balance of probabilities and as distinct from the McCann judgment. A breach of an ASBO is a criminal offence. There are all sorts of problems with ASBOs, for example they are initially imposed for two years with no variation or discharge possible. The balance of probabilities is the appropriate standard of proof here.
On the duration of conditions, it is right to say that the requirements and prohibitions that can be attached to an injunction can last until further order of the court, rather than until a specified date, but it is unlikely that the courts will grant an order with indefinite conditions without setting a review hearing. The guidance will also encourage the setting of review hearings for longer or indefinite injunctions. Also, the respondent can apply to vary or discharge any part or all of the injunction.
Injunctions are not a criminal sanction; they are a civil tool to prevent gang-related violence. We do not wish to criminalise respondents for breach of an injunction and that is why there is no such criminal offence. That is a clear difference from ASBOs.
An injunction can be imposed if that is necessary to protect the respondent from gang-related violence. Victims quickly become perpetrators and vice versa, particularly in retaliation attacks. In most cases, gang violence occurs between rival gang members. A person subject to an injunction would be a known gang member who had committed, encouraged or assisted gang violence. This provision focuses on the fact that in some cases a gang member is known to be putting themselves at risk of a reprisal attack. The hon. Member for Hornchurch made that point. That is why we have the reference to the protection of the individual; we are almost trying to protect them from themselves. I will give an actual example. A young man was known to be the target of a gang attack. He was warned of that, but insisted on continuing to enter the area in which he was going to be attacked. In such a scenario, we would want to prevent the gang-related violence, not just because of the individual respondent who is at risk both of committing violence and being the victim of violence in the event of a confrontation, but because of the risk to innocent bystanders who all too often are unwittingly caught up in fatal attacks by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. We therefore feel it necessary to have that option. The injunction is likely to be needed to prevent the respondent from engaging, assisting or facilitating gang-related violence, and from being a victim of such violence. The two go hand in hand.

James Brokenshire: I do not know whether the Minister would care to comment, but some police officers to whom I have spoken have indicated that, in reprisal situations, the alternate gang will sometimes seek to attack almost indiscriminately in the area around which a particular gang member may reside or is seen. Am I therefore correct in understanding that, in essence, the injunction will not only protect the individual subject to it from harm, but will also equally protect those around them who may innocently fall victim to an appalling crime simply by being in the wrong place at the wrong time?

Vernon Coaker: That is a reasonable point. The point of the injunction is to protect the individual from themselves, as it were, but, as a by-product of that, it may well end up protecting innocent people in a community who find themselves caught up in a gang-related attack. As the hon. Gentleman said, when people seek retaliation or revenge in an area, innocent people might be affected, so the injunction, while protecting the individual, may have the benefit of protecting innocent people in the community, or on a street, as a consequence.
I should also, by way of conclusion, refer to new clause 9, which relates to the end of the Bill. I would like to put it on record that it is the Governments intention basically to accept new clause 9, but we would like it to be withdrawn, because we need to redraft it appropriately. It is our intention to reinstate it on Report, which will be of interest to the hon. Members for Hornchurch and for Bury St. Edmunds, as well as the hon. Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) who is actually responsible for much of it.
We have had a good debate, and I have no further comments. If the provisions are successful in relation to over-18s, and we can find a way forward in relation to under-18s, we will significantly enhance safety on our streets. Furthermore, we will protect people who would otherwise be killed, prevent others from the effects of serious gang-related violence and prevent some individuals from ending up in prison on long-term sentences. I thank the Committee for todays debate.

Amendment 290 agreed to.

Clause 89, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 90 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 11

Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence
(1) A court may grant an injunction under this section if two conditions are met.
(2) The first condition is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has engaged in, or has encouraged or assisted, gang-related violence.
(3) The second condition is that the court thinks it is necessary to grant the injunction for either or both of the following purposes
(a) to prevent the respondent from engaging in, or encouraging or assisting, gang-related violence;
(b) to protect the respondent from gang-related violence.
(4) An injunction under this section may (for either or both of those purposes)
(a) prohibit the respondent from doing anything described in the injunction;
(b) require the respondent to do anything described in the injunction.
(5) In this section gang-related violence means violence or a threat of violence which occurs in the course of the activities of a gang or is otherwise related to such activities..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12

Contents of injunctions
(1) This section applies in relation to an injunction under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence].
(2) The prohibitions included in the injunction may, in particular, have the effect of prohibiting the respondent from
(a) being in a particular place;
(b) being with particular persons in a particular place;
(c) being in charge of a particular species of animal in a particular place;
(d) wearing particular descriptions of articles of clothing in a particular place;
(e) using the internet to facilitate or encourage violence.
(3) The requirements included in the injunction may, in particular, have the effect of requiring the respondent to
(a) notify the person who applied for the injunction of the respondents address and of any change to that address;
(b) be at a particular place between particular times on particular days;
(c) present himself or herself to a particular person at a place where he or she is required to be between particular times on particular days;
(d) participate in particular activities between particular times on particular days.
(4) A requirement of the kind mentioned in subsection (3)(b) may not be such as to require the respondent to be at a particular place for more than 8 hours in any day.
(5) The prohibitions and requirements included in the injunction must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid
(a) any conflict with the respondents religious beliefs, and
(b) any interference with the times, if any, at which the respondent normally works or attends any educational establishment.
(6) Nothing in subsection (2) or (3) affects the generality of section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence](4).
(7) In subsection (2) place includes an area..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 13

Contents of injunctions: supplemental
(1) This section applies in relation to an injunction under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence].
(2) The court must specify, in relation to each prohibition or requirement in the injunction, whether it is to be in force
(a) until further order, or
(b) until the end of a specified period.
(3) The court may order the applicant and the respondent to attend a review hearing on a specified date.
(4) A review hearing is a hearing held for the purpose of considering whether the injunction should be varied or discharged.
(5) The court may attach a power of arrest in relation to
(a) any prohibition in the injunction, or
(b) any requirement in the injunction, other than one which has the effect of requiring the respondent to participate in particular activities.
(6) If the court attaches a power of arrest, it may specify that the power is to have effect for a shorter period than the prohibition or requirement to which it relates..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Applications for injunctions under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence]
(1) An application for an injunction under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence] may be made by
(a) the chief officer of police for a police area,
(b) the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force, or
(c) a local authority.
(2) In this Part local authority means
(a) in relation to England, a district council, a county council, a London borough council, the Common Council of the City of London or the Council of the Isles of Scilly;
(b) in relation to Wales, a county council or a county borough council..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 15

Consultation by applicants for injunctions
(1) Before applying for an injunction under section [Applications for injunctions under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence]], the applicant must comply with the consultation requirement.
(2) In the case of an application by a chief officer of police, the consultation requirement is that the chief officer (the applicant chief officer) must consult
(a) any local authority that the applicant chief officer considers it would be appropriate to consult, and
(b) any other chief officer of police whom the applicant chief officer considers it would be appropriate to consult.
(3) In the case of an application by the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force, the consultation requirement is that the constable must consult
(a) any local authority that the constable considers it would be appropriate to consult, and
(b) any chief officer of police whom the constable considers it would be appropriate to consult.
(4) In the case of an application by a local authority, the consultation requirement is that the local authority (the applicant local authority) must consult
(a) any chief officer of police whom the applicant local authority considers it would be appropriate to consult, and
(b) any other local authority that the applicant local authority considers it would be appropriate to consult..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 16

Applications without notice
(1) An application under section [Applications for injunctions under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence]] may be made without the respondent being given notice.
(2) In this Part, such an application is referred to as an application without notice.
(3) Section [Consultation by applicants for injunctions](1) does not apply in relation to an application without notice.
(4) If an application without notice is made the court must either
(a) dismiss the application, or
(b) adjourn the proceedings.
(5) If the court acts under subsection (4)(b), the applicant must comply with the consultation requirement before the date of the first full hearing.
(6) In this section full hearing means a hearing of which notice has been given to the applicant and respondent in accordance with rules of court..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 17

Interim injunctions: adjournment of on notice hearing
(1) This section applies if
(a) the court adjourns the hearing of an application for an injunction under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence], and
(b) the respondent was notified of the hearing in accordance with rules of court.
(2) The court may grant an interim injunction if the court thinks that it is just and convenient to do so.
(3) An interim injunction granted under this section may not include a prohibition or requirement which is expressed to be in force until further order.
(4) Except as provided by subsection (3), an interim injunction under this section may include any provision which the court has power to include in an injunction granted under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence] (including a power of arrest)..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 18

Interim injunctions: adjournment of without notice hearing
(1) This section applies if the court adjourns the hearing of an application without notice under section [Applications without notice](4)(b).
(2) The court may grant an interim injunction if it thinks that it is necessary to do so.
(3) An interim injunction under this section may not
(a) include a prohibition or requirement which is expressed to be in force until further order, or
(b) have the effect of requiring the respondent to participate in particular activities.
(4) Except as provided by subsection (3), an interim injunction under this section may include any provision which the court has power to include in an injunction granted under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence] (including a power of arrest)..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 19

Variation or discharge of injunctions
(1) The court may vary or discharge an injunction under this Part if either
(a) a review hearing is held, or
(b) an application to vary or discharge the injunction is made.
(2) An application to vary or discharge the injunction may be made by
(a) the person who applied for the injunction;
(b) the respondent.
(3) Before applying for the variation or discharge of an injunction, a person mentioned in subsection (2)(a) must notify the persons consulted under section [Consultation by applicants for injunctions](1) or [Applications without notice](5)..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 20

Arrest without warrant
(1) This section applies if a power of arrest is attached to a provision of an injunction under this Part.
(2) A constable may arrest without warrant a person whom the constable has reasonable cause to suspect to be in breach of the provision.
(3) If a constable arrests a person under subsection (2), the constable must inform the person who applied for the injunction.
(4) A person arrested under subsection (2) must be brought before a relevant judge within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest.
(5) If the matter is not disposed of when the person is brought before the judge, the judge may remand the person.
(6) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (4) ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday and any Sunday are to be disregarded.
(7) In this Part relevant judge, in relation to an injunction, means
(a) where the injunction was granted by the High Court, a judge of that court;
(b) where the injunction was granted by a county court, a judge or district judge of that or any other county court..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21

Issue of warrant of arrest
(1) This section applies in relation to an injunction under this Part.
(2) If the person who applied for the injunction considers that the respondent is in breach of any of its provisions, the person may apply to a relevant judge for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the respondent.
(3) A relevant judge may not issue a warrant on an application under subsection (2) unless the judge has reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent is in breach of any provision of the injunction.
(4) If a person is brought before a court by virtue of a warrant under subsection (3), but the matter is not disposed of, the court may remand the person..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22

Remand for medical examination and report
(1) This section applies in relation to a person who is brought before the relevant judge or the court under section [Arrest without warrant] or [Issue of warrant of arrest].
(2) If the relevant judge or the court has reason to consider that a medical report will be required, the judge or the court may remand the person under section [Arrest without warrant](5) or (as the case may be) [Issue of warrant of arrest](4) for the purpose of enabling a medical examination to take place and a report to be made.
(3) If the person is remanded in custody for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than 3 weeks at a time.
(4) If the person is remanded on bail for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than 4 weeks at a time.
(5) If the relevant judge or the court has reason to suspect that the person is suffering from a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983, the judge or the court has the same power to make an order under section 35 of that Act (remand for report on accuseds medical condition) as the Crown Court has under that section in the case of an accused person (within the meaning of that section).. (Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 23

Further provision about remands
Schedule [Injunctions: powers to remand] (which makes further provision about the remand of a person under sections [Arrest without warrant](5) and [Issue of warrant of arrest](4)) has effect..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 24

Guidance
(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance relating to injunctions under this Part.
(2) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under subsection (1).
(3) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance issued or revised under this section.
(4) Each of the following must have regard to any guidance published under subsection (3)
(a) a chief officer of police for a police area;
(b) the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(c) a local authority..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 25

Supplemental
(1) Rules of court may provide that any power conferred on a county court to grant, vary or discharge an injunction under this Part may be exercised by a judge or district judge of that court.
(2) Rules of court may provide that an appeal from a decision of the High Court or county court to which this subsection applies may be made without notice being given to the respondent.
(3) Subsection (2) applies to a decision to refuse to grant an interim injunction under section [Interim injunctions: adjournment of without notice hearing]..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 26

Interpretation
(1) In this Part
application without notice has the meaning given by section [Applications without notice](2);
court means the High Court or a county court;
local authority has the meaning given by section [Applications for injunctions under section [Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence](2)];
relevant judge has the meaning given by section [Arrest without warrant](7);
respondent means the person in respect of whom an application for an injunction is made or (as the context requires) the person against whom such an injunction is granted;
review hearing has the meaning given by section [Contents of injunctions: supplemental](4);
specify, in relation to an injunction, means specify in the injunction;
violence includes violence against property.
(2) Any reference in this Part to an injunction under this Part includes a reference to an interim injunction..(Mr. Campbell.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 27

Notification of proposal to include person in barred list: England and Wales
(1) The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (c. 47) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 34 insert
34A Notification of proposal to include person in childrens barred list
(1) If ISA proposes to include a person (B) in the childrens barred list in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 3(1) or 5(1) of Schedule 3, it
(a) must notify any person who is registered in relation to B under section 32 in relation to regulated activity relating to children, and
(b) may notify any other person who it is satisfied falls within subsection (2).
(2) The following fall within this subsection
(a) any person who is permitting B to engage in regulated activity relating to children,
(b) any responsible person (within the meaning of section 23) who is permitting B to engage in controlled activity relating to children.
(3) A notification under this section must
(a) explain that ISA has not yet taken a final decision about whether to include B in the barred list, and
(b) include such information as ISA thinks appropriate about its reasons for proposing to include B in the barred list.
(4) The requirement to notify a person under subsection (1)(a) is satisfied if notification is sent to any address recorded against that persons name in the register.
34B Notification of proposal to include person in adults barred list
(1) If ISA proposes to include a person (B) in the adults barred list in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 9(1) or 11(1) of Schedule 3, it
(a) must notify any person who is registered in relation to B under section 32 in relation to regulated activity relating to vulnerable adults, and
(b) may notify any other person who it is satisfied falls within subsection (2).
(2) The following fall within this subsection
(a) any person who is permitting B to engage in regulated activity relating to vulnerable adults,
(b) any responsible person (within the meaning of section 23) who is permitting B to engage in controlled activity relating to vulnerable adults.
(3) A notification under this section must
(a) explain that ISA has not yet taken a final decision about whether to include B in the barred list, and
(b) include such information as ISA thinks appropriate about its reasons for proposing to include B in the barred list.
(4) The requirement to notify a person under subsection (1)(a) is satisfied if notification is sent to any address recorded against that persons name in the register.
34C Sections 34A and 34B: notification of outcome
(1) Subsection (2) applies if ISA
(a) has notified a person (A) under section 34A or 34B that it proposes to include another (B) in a barred list, and
(b) includes B in the barred list or decides not to do so.
(2) ISA must notify A that it has included B in the barred list or that it has decided not to do so (as the case may be).
(3) In a case where A is registered in relation to B under section 32 (or has ceased to be so registered by virtue of Bs inclusion in the barred list), the requirement in subsection (2) is satisfied if notification is sent to any address recorded (or, as the case may be, formerly recorded) against As name in the register.
(3) In section 31 (vetting information)
(a) in subsections (2) and (3), omit paragraph (b) and the , and immediately before it, and
(b) omit subsections (4) and (5)..(Mr. Campbell.)

This amendment requires the IBB to notify any registered party, and empowers the IBB to notify anyone else whom it is satisfied is an interested party, with reasons, when it proposes to bar someone from working with children or vulnerable adults. A further notification must give the IBBs final decision.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 28

Notification of proposal to include person in barred list: Northern Ireland
(1) The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups (Northern Ireland) Order 2007 (S.I. 2007/1351 (N.I. 11)) is amended as follows.
(2) After Article 36 insert
36A Notification of proposal to include person in childrens barred list
(1) If ISA proposes to include a person (B) in the childrens barred list in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 3(1) or 5(1) of Schedule 1, it
(a) must notify any person who is registered in relation to B under Article 34 in relation to regulated activity relating to children, and
(b) may notify any other person who it is satisfied falls within paragraph (2).
(2) The following fall within this paragraph
(a) any person who is permitting B to engage in regulated activity relating to children,
(b) any responsible person (within the meaning of Article 27) who is permitting B to engage in controlled activity relating to children.
(3) A notification under this Article must
(a) explain that ISA has not yet taken a final decision about whether to include B in the barred list, and
(b) include such information as ISA thinks appropriate about its reasons for proposing to include B in the barred list.
(4) The requirement to notify a person under paragraph (1)(a) is satisfied if notification is sent to any address recorded against that persons name in the register.
36B Notification of proposal to include person in adults barred list
(1) If ISA proposes to include a person (B) in the adults barred list in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 9(1) or 11(1) of Schedule 1, it
(a) must notify any person who is registered in relation to B under Article 34 in relation to regulated activity relating to vulnerable adults, and
(b) may notify any other person who it is satisfied falls within paragraph (2).
(2) The following fall within this paragraph
(a) any person who is permitting B to engage in regulated activity relating to vulnerable adults,
(b) any responsible person (within the meaning of Article 27) who is permitting B to engage in controlled activity relating to vulnerable adults.
(3) A notification under this Article must
(a) explain that ISA has not yet taken a final decision about whether to include B in the barred list, and
(b) include such information as ISA thinks appropriate about its reasons for proposing to include B in the barred list.
(4) The requirement to notify a person under paragraph (1)(a) is satisfied if notification is sent to any address recorded against that persons name in the register.
36C Articles 36A and 36B: notification of outcome
(1) Paragraph (2) applies if ISA
(a) has notified a person (A) under Article 36A or 36B that it proposes to include another (B) in a barred list, and
(b) includes B in the barred list or decides not to do so.
(2) ISA must notify A that it has included B in the barred list or that it has decided not to do so (as the case may be).
(3) In a case where A is registered in relation to B under Article 34 (or has ceased to be so registered by virtue of Bs inclusion in the barred list), the requirement in paragraph (2) is satisfied if notification is sent to any address recorded (or, as the case may be, formerly recorded) against As name in the register.
(3) In Article 33 (vetting information)
(a) in paragraphs (2) and (3), omit sub-paragraph (b) and the , and immediately before it, and
(b) omit paragraphs (4) and (5)..(Mr. Campbell.)

This amendment makes equivalent provision in relation to Northern Ireland to that made in relation to England and Wales by amendment NC27.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 29

Provision of safeguarding information to the police: England and Wales
After section 50 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (c. 47) insert

Provision of information to the police
50A Provision of information to the police
(1) ISA may provide any information it has to a chief officer of police for use for any of the following purposes
(a) the prevention, detection and investigation of crime;
(b) the apprehension and prosecution of offenders.
(2) The power conferred by subsection (1) does not limit any other power of ISA to provide information for any purpose or to any person..(Mr. Campbell.)

This amendment empowers the IBB to provide information that it has to the police, for use by the police for the purposes set out in the amendment.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 30

Provision of safeguarding information to the police: Northern Ireland
After Article 52 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups (Northern Ireland) Order 2007 (S.I. 2007/1351 (N.I. 11)) insert

Provision of information to the police
52A Provision of information to the police
(1) ISA may provide any information it has to the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland for use for any of the following purposes
(a) the prevention, detection and investigation of crime;
(b) the apprehension and prosecution of offenders.
(2) The power conferred by paragraph (1) does not limit any other power of ISA to provide information for any purpose or to any person..(Mr. Campbell.)

This amendment makes equivalent provision in relation to Northern Ireland to that made in relation to England and Wales by amendment NC29.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 31

Barring process: England and Wales
(1) Schedule 3 to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (c. 47) (barred lists) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1 (automatic inclusion in childrens barred list) for sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) substitute
(2) If the Secretary of State has reason to believe that this paragraph might apply to a person, the Secretary of State must refer the matter to ISA.
(3) If ISA is satisfied that this paragraph applies to the person, it must include the person in the childrens barred list.
(3) In paragraph 2 (inclusion in childrens barred list subject to consideration of representations) for sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) substitute
(2) If the Secretary of State has reason to believe that this paragraph might apply to a person, the Secretary of State must refer the matter to ISA.
(3) If ISA is satisfied that this paragraph applies to the person, it must
(a) include the person in the childrens barred list, and
(b) give the person an opportunity to make representations as to why the person should be removed from the childrens barred list.
(4) In paragraph 7 (automatic inclusion in adults barred list) for sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) substitute
(2) If the Secretary of State has reason to believe that this paragraph might apply to a person, the Secretary of State must refer the matter to ISA.
(3) If ISA is satisfied that this paragraph applies to the person, it must include the person in the adults barred list.
(5) In paragraph 8 (inclusion in adults barred list subject to consideration of representations) for sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) substitute
(2) If the Secretary of State has reason to believe that this paragraph might apply to a person, the Secretary of State must refer the matter to ISA.
(3) If ISA is satisfied that this paragraph applies to the person, it must
(a) include the person in the adults barred list, and
(b) give the person an opportunity to make representations as to why the person should be removed from the adults barred list.
(6) In paragraph 24(8) (Secretary of State to examine records of convictions or cautions from time to time) for whether the criteria apply to an individual substitute whether there is reason to believe that the criteria might apply to an individual..(Mr. Campbell.)

This amendment adjusts the procedure for automatic barring so that it is the IBB that must be satisfied that a person has met prescribed criteria before the IBB is required to bar the person and makes a consequential change to the duty on the Secretary of State to check records.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 32

Barring process: Northern Ireland
(1) Schedule 1 to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups (Northern Ireland) Order 2007 (S.I. 2007/1351 (N.I. 11)) (barred lists) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1 (automatic inclusion in childrens barred list) for sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) substitute
(2) If the Secretary of State has reason to believe that this paragraph might apply to a person, the Secretary of State must refer the matter to ISA.
(3) If ISA is satisfied that this paragraph applies to the person, it must include the person in the childrens barred list.
(3) In paragraph 2 (inclusion in childrens barred list subject to consideration of representations) for sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) substitute
(2) If the Secretary of State has reason to believe that this paragraph might apply to a person, the Secretary of State must refer the matter to ISA.
(3) If ISA is satisfied that this paragraph applies to the person, it must
(a) include the person in the childrens barred list, and
(b) give the person an opportunity to make representations as to why the person should be removed from the childrens barred list.
(4) In paragraph 7 (automatic inclusion in adults barred list) for sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) substitute
(2) If the Secretary of State has reason to believe that this paragraph might apply to a person, the Secretary of State must refer the matter to ISA.
(3) If ISA is satisfied that this paragraph applies to the person, it must include the person in the adults barred list.
(5) In paragraph 8 (inclusion in adults barred list subject to consideration of representations) for sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) substitute
(2) If the Secretary of State has reason to believe that this paragraph might apply to a person, the Secretary of State must refer the matter to ISA.
(3) If ISA is satisfied that this paragraph applies to the person, it must
(a) include the person in the adults barred list, and
(b) give the person an opportunity to make representations as to why the person should be removed from the adults barred list.
(6) In paragraph 24(8) (Secretary of State to examine records of convictions or cautions from time to time) for whether the criteria apply to an individual substitute whether there is reason to believe that the criteria might apply to an individual..(Mr. Campbell.)

This amendment makes equivalent provision in relation to Northern Ireland to that made in relation to England and Wales by amendment NC31.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 33

Retention and destruction of samples etc: England and Wales
(1) After section 64A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60) insert
64B Retention and destruction of samples etc
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision as to the retention, use and destruction of material to which this section applies.
(2) This section applies to the following material
(a) photographs falling within a description specified in the regulations,
(b) fingerprints taken from a person in connection with the investigation of an offence,
(c) impressions of footwear so taken from a person,
(d) DNA and other samples so taken from a person,
(e) information derived from DNA samples so taken from a person.
(3) The regulations may
(a) make different provision for different cases, and
(b) make provision subject to such exceptions as the Secretary of State thinks fit.
(4) The regulations may frame any provision or exception by reference to an approval or consent given in accordance with the regulations.
(5) The regulations may confer functions on persons specified or described in the regulations.
(6) The functions which may be conferred by virtue of subsection (5) include those of
(a) providing information about the operation of regulations made under this section,
(b) keeping their operation under review,
(c) making reports to the Secretary of State about their operation, and
(d) making recommendations to the Secretary of State about the retention, use and destruction of material to which this section applies.
(7) The regulations may make provision for and in connection with establishing a body to discharge the functions mentioned in subsection (6)(b) to (d).
(8) The regulations may make provision amending, repealing, revoking or otherwise modifying any provision made by or under an Act (including this Act).
(9) The provision which may be made by virtue of subsection (8) includes amending or otherwise modifying any provision so as to impose a duty or confer a power to make an order, regulations, a code of practice or any other instrument.
(10) For the purposes of this section
(a) photograph includes a moving image, and
(b) the reference to a DNA sample is a reference to any material that has come from a human body and consists of or includes human cells.
64C Retention and destruction of samples etc: supplementary
(1) Regulations under section 64B may make
(a) supplementary, incidental or consequential provision, or
(b) transitional, transitory or saving provision.
(2) Regulations under that section are to be made by statutory instrument.
(3) An instrument containing regulations under that section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, each House of Parliament.
(2) The amendment made by subsection (1) applies in relation to material obtained before or after the commencement of this section..(Mr. Campbell.)

This amendment, responding to the ECtHR judgement in S and Marper v UK on 4 December 2008, would amend the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, creating a power to make regulations on the retention, use and destruction of photographs, fingerprints, footwear impressions, DNA and other samples and DNA profiles.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Alan Campbell: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Hugh Bayley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 34Retention and destruction of samples etc: service offences.
Government new clause 35Retention and destruction of samples etc: Northern Ireland.

Alan Campbell: The purpose of new clause 33 is to provide for regulations to be made to enable the Government to respond to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of S and Marper. The Court found that the existing policy under part V of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was in breach of the right to respect for private life in article 8 of the European convention on human rights. The Court held that the blanket nature of the powers to retain DNA samples and fingerprints of people who were arrested but have not been found guilty of an offence or against whom no further action was taken, failed to strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and therefore constituted a disproportionate interference with the article 8 right.
We robustly defended the S and Marper case at all stages of our domestic courts and we were strongly of the belief that what we had introduced with the consent of Parliament was an effective and proportionate approach to help tackle crime and bring offenders to justice. We know from research between May 2001 and 31 December 2005 that there were approximately 200,000 DNA profiles on the national DNA database, which would previously have had to be removedbefore legislation was passed in 2001because the person was acquitted or charges dropped.
Of those 200,000 profiles, approximately 8,500 from some 6,290 individuals have been linked with crime scene profiles, involving nearly 14,000 offences. These include 114 murders, 55 attempted murders, 116 rapes, 68 sexual offences, 119 aggravated burglaries and 127 offences of supplying controlled drugs. Therefore, as that approach was a major contribution to the identification and detection of offenders, we are understandably disappointed in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.
Technological developments and, in particular, the use of DNA in investigations has been one of the breakthroughs for modern policing in which we have led the world. It has led not only to convictions for serious crimes, but to the exoneration of the innocent. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that many people whose DNA was on the database may have been deterred from committing crimes because they knew that detection was inevitable. We continue to believe that DNA and fingerprints play an invaluable role in fighting crime, and will now carefully consider how best to give effect to the Courts findings.
Part of that process lies in informing the Council of Europes Committee of Ministers of progress and of final proposals for implementing the decision. A second and key part lies in ensuring that sufficient public debate takes place on whatever we propose and how it is implemented. The judgment recognised the level of public interest in and, indeed, public disquiet with the current retention policy. That is why we intend to publish a public consultation paper before the summer with proposals on retention and future governance in this important area.
We recognise that some people who are currently on the DNA and fingerprint databases and who have been arrested but not convicted may feel frustrated that their samples are not being destroyed in the light of the European Court judgment. As the Committee will be aware, the existing law stands until such time as it is changed or amended by the United Kingdom Parliament. The contents of this enabling clause are drafted to allow for a retention and destruction framework to be put in place to ensure compliance with the European Court judgment within a reasonable time, and for such regulations to be subject to consideration by both Houses.
In her speech to the Intellect Technology Association on 16 December 2008, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said that the public expect us to make use of technology to protect them, and that people instinctively understand that these technologies, used properly, are vital tools against crime, terrorism and illegal immigration. But she also recognised the absolute necessity of getting the balance on privacy right, and that there is more we can do to strengthen the dividing line between guilt and innocence. For those who have committed a serious offence, our retention policies need to be as tough as possible, but for others, including children, there is scope to introduce a more flexible approach.
We intend to consult on bringing greater flexibility and fairness into the system by stepping down some individuals over time by using a differentiated approach, possibly based on age, or on risk, or on the nature of the offences involved. We will also re-examine retention arrangements for samples. We have informed the Committee of Ministers of our intention to consult and of compliance to date with the judgment in respect of the relevant samples of S and Marper, as well as the payment of costs and expenses. The information will be considered by that Committee at its next meeting on 19 March.
I hope Members of this Committee will recognise that we are committed to implementing the judgment. There are significant policing operational issues involved in complying with the judgment, but at the core is the need to ensure a proportionate level of public protection. This is an important issue, which is why the approach that we are proposing focuses on open public debate and parliamentary consideration.
The purpose of new clause 34 is to ensure that regulations, which will be equivalent to those provided for in new clause 33, can be made in respect of material obtained by the service police in each of the armed forces. Section 113 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows the Secretary of State to apply any of the provisions in part 5 of the Act to the armed forces, subject to any modifications that he considers necessary in order to cater for the different procedures under which the armed forces operate.
Part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act is already applied to the armed forces by means of a statutory instrument made under section 113. Section 113, therefore, needs to be amended to allow regulations to be made for the armed forces which will be closely based on the regulations provided for in new clause 33. Biometric data obtained by the service police in each of the armed forces will therefore be treated in the same way as biometric data obtained by civilian police forces, subject to the different circumstances in which the service police conduct investigations. This will ensure that the UKs response to the S and Marper judgment in the European Court of Human Rights is comprehensive.
The purpose of new clause 35 is to ensure that regulations, which will be equivalent to those provided for in new clause 33, can be made in respect of material obtained by the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The regime governing the retention and destruction of samples in Northern Ireland is contained within the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 and the amendment makes provision for similar regulations to those provided for in new clause 33. This will ensure that the UKs response to the S and Marper judgment in the European Court of Human Rights is comprehensive.

James Brokenshire: The Opposition have consistently called for a full debate on the DNA database, so I welcome the opportunity to consider some of the issues in the context of the new clauses proposed by the Government. I regret that our consideration is necessarily so partial and focused on whether we should give authority to the Home Secretary to make regulations governing the retention and destruction of DNA, fingerprint, photographic, CCTV and other records. If we grant the proposal, it would prevent and frustrate the very parliamentary debate that we have been seeking, allowing all MPs to contribute. The Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing said in his letter to the Committee that the means would be the affirmative resolution procedure.
Before I develop the detail of the argument surrounding the proposals, I want to start with one point of agreement with the Minister. We agree that the use of DNA samples can be an important evidential tool in prosecuting and bringing crimes to justice. We are all aware of cases where DNA data have formed an important part of the case to prove guilt and ensure that serious criminals have been put behind bars, where they belong. The fight against crime, in particular organised crime and terrorism, depends on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification.
However, the status of DNA needs to be considered carefully. As the European Court of Human Rights noted:
The retention of cellular samples is particularly intrusive given the wealth of genetic and health information contained therein.
The use of that technology must strike the right balance between the promotion of the wider public interest and public safety, and the protection of important private life interests, which is central to the debate and the Governments proposals.
The UKs DNA database is the largest in the world, containing approximately 4.3 million profiles, which accounts for around 5.2 per cent. of the UK population. The Government argue, as did the Minister, that this country claims a pioneering role in the utilisation of DNA technology, but in doing so it bears a special responsibility to ensure that it strikes the right balance on what is permissible in the potential interference in private life.
The central question that the new clause seeks to address, although without spelling out the solution, is the extent to which the Government should retain DNA and other data on people who have been suspected of committing a criminal offence but who have never been charged or have been acquitted. Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, fingerprints and samples, including DNA samples, can be taken from anyone arrested for a recordable offence and detained in a police station. However, the Home Office has confirmed that 1.1 million people on the database have never been convicted, cautioned or even formally warned or reprimanded, as recorded by the police national computer.
GeneWatch has calculated that there are records of 100,000 innocent children on the database, and the records of 521,901 under-16-year-olds have been added to the database since 1996. The database contains the records of around 40 per cent. of black men in the UK, compared with 13 per cent. of Asian men and just 9 per cent. of white men. As the Minister will be aware, one of the issues that the Court highlighted was the potentially disproportionate impact that the operation of the database has on young children and people from minority ethnic communities, which needs to be considered carefully in the context of the debate on what is proportionate and reasonable.
I shall move on to the details of the case of S and Marper shortly, but I would like to read out a paragraph from the Courts judgment that puts a disturbing gloss on the Governments view of DNA data and, by extension, the potential use of the powers that they seek under the new clauses. Paragraph 123 of the judgment states:
The Government argue that the power of retention applies to all fingerprints and samples taken from a person in connection with the investigation of an offence and does not depend on innocence or guilt. It is further submitted that the fingerprints and samples have been lawfully taken and that their retention is not related to the fact that they were originally suspected of committing a crime, the sole reason for their retention being to increase the size and, therefore, the use of the database in the identification of offenders in the future.
If the Court has accurately stated the Governments policy position, which is what we need to be clear about, it is in essence saying that there is a simple primary policy intention to grow the database, and that even suspicion of guilt is not regarded as a triggering factor. That might not be reflected in the current law and seems to have been a policy statement that the Court has highlighted from the evidence that it was given in the course of its considerations, but it is a significant point to consider when the Government tell us that we should rely on their assurances.
We need to understand clearly the Governments stand on that, so will the Minister confirm that they argued their case on that basis and that the natural extension of that line of logic is that everyone is a potential suspect? Is it now the case that one is innocent until proven guilty in the eyes of the criminal law, but always potentially guilty in the eyes of the DNA database? I base those points in all seriousness on that paragraph in the Courts judgment and am not seeking to make a pejorative or debating point. I am simple reading from the Court judgment and interpreting from it what seems to be an intention that was argued at the Court, because it is pretty fundamental in understanding where the Government are coming from. If that is the case, how can we trust the Government to look after our liberties, as the measures imply that we would seek to do, if their fundamental stating point is that there do not necessarily need to be grounds of suspicion for obtaining information in the first place?
In that context, I wholeheartedly agree with recommendations I and J in the first annual report of the ethics group on the national DNA database, which was published on 21 July 2008. Recommendation I states:
Consideration should be given to further public clarification of the role of the NDNAD and reinforcement of the message that it is intended only to be used for criminal intelligence.
Recommendation J states:
Consideration should be given to formally announcing publicly that the NDNAD will only be used for the currently described purposes (i.e. criminal intelligence) and will never transform into a repository for the whole nations DNA characteristics.
Will the Minister indicate whether the Home Department agrees with those recommendations so that we can gain a better understanding of the Governments likely approach in the context of the order-making powers that it seeks in the new clause?
The ethics group also raised questions about DNA samples given by the public voluntarily. Will the Minister confirm how many DNA samples on the national DNA database have been given voluntarily? Will he also confirm that the intended White Paper, which the order-making power under the new clauses is intended to implement, will address the scope of use of those samples, and the retention and process for destruction of volunteered samples? The ethics committee suggested, in various recommendations, that further clarification is needed. While I accept that the law on obtaining samples suggests that there is an automatic requirement of destruction, the fact that the ethics committee raises such a number of recommendations about volunteered DNA data clearly suggests that it has some concerns.
Will the Minister also confirm whether the Government have any intention to extend the authority required to take DNA samples in cases of non-notifiable offences, as was suggested at one point? In other words, will they extend the existing authority to take DNA samples when there is a notifiable offence to non-notifiable offences as well, which could lower the authority to minor offences?
We have long argued for the need to ensure that the police can retrospectively take samples for a longer period after conviction and from those convicted overseas, so we are glad that the Government have responded positively to that call. Will the Minister confirm that that will also form part of the White Paper, together with the removal of profiles for children under 10?
The official Opposition believe that there should be an established procedure to allow a person to request a statement on what information, relating to fingerprints and samples, is being held on either them or a dependant. We think that there should be a procedure by which a person can request that such information held on them or a dependant is destroyed, and that the circumstances in which such a request might be refused should be set out. Will the Minister indicate whether he envisages the White Paper encompassing issues of that nature and, by extension, the application to familial links? DNA might not necessarily simply indicate one individual, as a siblings DNA might have similar characteristics. Some of the concerns attached to the debate relate to whether DNA can be identified. It can, in part, be matched to ones own DNA, but it is the familial link that applies, and a close relation might be actually indicated.
In his letter to the members of the Committee explaining why the Government were bringing forward those new clauses, the Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing rightly said that their actions had been necessitated by the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of S and Marper. I welcome his statement, and the comments of the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Tynemouth, that the Government are committed to its implementation as soon as possible. In that landmark judgment, the Court held that there had been a violation of article 8 of the European convention on human rights. The Lord Chancellor, in his response to the Court ruling, was right to highlight paragraph 119 of that judgment. That is importantI hope that you will allow me to put it on record in the context of the debate, Mr. Bayleyas it informs the framework that the Government need to work to with regard to the power that they are now seeking under the new clause.
On the issue of proportionality and the fair balance between competing public and private interests, the Court said:
In this respect, the Court is struck by the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the power of retention in England and Wales. The material may be retained irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offence with which the individual was originally suspected or of the age of the suspected offender; fingerprints and samples may be takenand retainedfrom a person of any age, arrested in connection with a recordable offence, which includes minor or non-imprisonable offences. The retention is not time-limited; the material is retained indefinitely whatever the nature or seriousness of the offence of which the person was suspected. Moreover, there exist only limited possibilities for an acquitted individual to have the data removed from the nationwide database or the materials destroyed ...; in particular, there is no provision for independent review of the justification for the retention according to defined criteria, including such factors as the seriousness of the offence, previous arrests, the strength of the suspicion against the person and any other special circumstances.
I apologise for reading out that somewhat lengthy extract, but it really goes to the heart of what we are considering. As I said, the Lord Chancellor rightly drew attention to it, and it is important in understanding where we are all coming from. That very paragraph sets out some of the benchmarks and indicators that we would certainly expect to see in the detailed proposals that the Government are yet to publish in their formal response to the particular court case.
However, given what the Court said, I must say, with respect, that I think that the Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing may have slightly missed the point in his letter to the Committeeindeed, the Under-Secretary of State might have done so too in his opening remarkswhen he suggested that the Court recognised that the retention of biometric data could be retained
on consideration of the individual circumstances.
The Court judgment goes much deeper than saying, as that quote from the Minister suggests, that it is a case of individual review of individual circumstances. What the Court is saying goes to the structurethe fundamental protections and reviewsthat exists, rather than saying that, in some way, this could be dealt with by means of case-by-case consideration.
The Court was very clear, and in many ways it was very critical. Whatever the Government or we may think about whether the Court was right, we have the judgment. It highlighted very clearly that England and Walestreated as one countryis the only country in Europe adopting these procedures. Scotland has a different procedure, and I note that an amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Chesterfield, although not selected, alluded in some ways to the Scottish situation. There is a different standard in Scotland than in England and Wales. Effectively, DNA data are not retained when someone has been acquitted. The data can be retained for three years if there was a violent offence or a case involving a sexual offence, and that period can be extended to five years, but in other circumstances, the DNA data cannot be retained if there has been an acquittal or if no charges were brought. Therefore, even in this countryI use that word to mean the United Kingdom as a wholethe approaches in England and Wales and in Scotland differ. Consequently, what the Court said about the current system and situation that we have in this country went quite deep.
That is why we believe that it is right that the DNA database as a whole is put on a formal statutory footing. That goes further than simply having a power of regulation in respect of the Home Secretary saying what the retention and destruction issues should be. In this context, we need a more fundamental statement about the DNA database itself. In our view, at this stage, it is not acceptable simply to give what amounts to almost blank-cheque authorisation under the new clauses on the basis of the White Paper that the Under-Secretary says will be forthcoming at some stage before the summer.
I agree with the Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing and the Under-Secretary about the importance of this debate. I know that the Under-Secretary said that there was considerable public interest and public concern, and that the Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing said in his letter:
This is an area of significant importance which impacts on public protection and confidence.
That gains even more significance when we consider the potential ambit of data sharing among parties. That is the subject of debate on the Coroners and Justice Bill, in which a power is being sought to share data among relevant bodies in an unspecified manner at the authorisation of the Secretary of Statethe Secretary of State for Justice in that case. Therefore, when setting the boundaries for data retention, there should be consideration of whether, and to what extent, those data will be shared in a wider format. I appreciate that that is a debate for another Committee on another Bill, but it gives context to discussions about the DNA database and the retention and sharing of that information with third parties. Potentially, this goes wider than the domestic setting.
On 12 June 2007, UK Ministers attending the European Union Justice and Home Affairs Council backed a plan to extend the Prum treaty to the whole of the EU. Can the Minister confirm that that means that all EU member states will have automatic access to Britains DNA database? Is that the direction of travel? To better assess what is and is not appropriate in the retention and destruction of data held on that database, it is important to understand the significance of the DNA database and what it may be used for in a domestic and, potentially, pan-European setting. It is fundamentally important to understand where we are going with this measure.
Given the significance and importance of the topic, why is it being swept under the affirmative resolution procedure? With that procedure, I assume that it will not be possible to amend the regulations and we will only have an hour and a half of debate in Committee on these fundamental issues. There are serious issues of public confidence, as Ministers have identified. The other place almost has a convention of not rejecting secondary legislation. I have serious concerns about how the issue is being approached. The irony is that we may have a longer debate in this Committee on the order-making power than will be permissible on the substantive issues of the retention of DNA and the fundamentals that apply.
The Minister has said that he wants a debate but the impression is that, rather than promoting debate, the Government do not want it. Instead, they want to deny the debate that would allow all hon. Members the opportunity to consider the proposals in detail and to make amendments if required. It will be interesting to see how the Government put forward the changes that they propose in the light of the Court judgment. I assure the Minister that we will work constructively with him on this because we recognise its importance and significance, as he does.
Simply to present a set of regulations and, in essence, say, Take it or leave it will not allow the necessary scrutiny, debate and consideration that the issue rightfully demands. Even in seeking the power, the Government cannot give us any indication of their intentions. As the Minister says:
We are not in a position at this stage to produce detailed proposals.
If they make that admission, how can they expect the Committee or the House to give an authorisation without any idea of how such authority would be used?
I appreciate that issues with the parliamentary timetable are often used as justification for the argument, Well, we have a Bill before us now and we should use this opportunity as it may be the only primary legislation that we get. That does not wash. The issue demands primary legislation that can be properly scrutinised and examined, in detail, line by line to ensure that appropriate protections are provided.
The Constitution Committee in the other place, in its recent report, Surveillance: Citizens and the State recommended:
The Government should introduce a Bill to replace the existing regulatory framework governing the NDNAD. This would provide an opportunity to reassess the length of time DNA profiles are retained and the regulatory oversight of the NDNAD.
We agree. The use, retention and destruction of DNA records and the oversight that sits behind that require detailed primary legislation in their own right, with full and detailed debate and examination in Parliament of the proposals that the Government bring forward by all Members of Parliament. I can assure the Minister that if he does so Her Majestys Opposition will work with the Government in a constructive way in the public interest. The issues at stake are too serious to do otherwise.
Trust me was a phrase frequently used by the former Prime Minister Tony Blair. That is precisely what the Minister and the Home Secretary are asking us to do by virtue of this clauseto trust themas we would be approving a significant and wide-ranging authority applicable now and in the future on a promise of the White Paper and a promise that the Government intend to address the issues highlighted in the recent European Court of Human Rights case. But the nature of this subject puts it beyond questions of simple trust of a particular Minister or even a particular Government. Once the authority is there it remains in place and can be used in the future by any future Government too. I appreciate that we cannot bind future Governments, but we can signpost them. If this is in place it makes a fundamental departure.
In making those comments I am not seeking to impugn the Minister, the Home Secretary or the Governments intentions. We have to operate in a vacuum in this context. We do not know the basic principles, notwithstanding what may have been set up in the new clause and certain statements that it could include this, that and the other. The order-making power encompasses that; but we do not actually know.
Surely it would be more appropriate for us to consider what changes are appropriate in legislation once we have an indication from the Government of their intentions. Then we can have that public debate that the Minister has rightly said is needed and that he wants. We can have that detailed scrutiny. We can consider what strikes the right balance between the public interests and the protection of the private interests that is at the heart of our debate this afternoon.
That is why I say to the Minister in clear and unambiguous terms that the proposal he has set forward in these new clauses is utterly unacceptable and if the Government are insistent on taking this approach we will oppose it tooth and nail.

Paul Holmes: When we discussed the late entry of the clauses on gangs I made the point that it was a great shame that they were introduced at a very late stage. They were not available to be debated on Second Reading or at the start of our Committee proceedings. They came in just at the start of the recess week. It has been difficult therefore to do all the research and to have the full debate that we need on them. Nevertheless we had a constructive debate and the Minister said some reassuring things and we made some progress. Those points have to be made a thousand times more on this issue.
These new clauses are of crucial importance. They concern the DNA database which has been a long-running and controversial issue in Parliament, but they were introduced by the Government last Friday at the end of recess week. They were made available publicly on Monday of this week. A number of organisations that would normally respond on something like this have not had time to get to grips with it. We looked at it and tabled some amendments, but it was too late for the Tuesday midday deadline for them to be considered here. On such a major issue that is completely unacceptable.
I do not know what the explanation will be for that very last-minute production of these new clauses, but I do not think that it will be a very convincing one. The Minister cannot say that the Government are surprised about this being an issue and by the judgment in the S and Marper case, or that they are surprised that anyone should regard the DNA issue as controversial and that it came out of the blue. It has been argued about a great deal both in and outside Parliament. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, Central (Jenny Willott) introduced a ten-minute Bill on precisely that issue in June 2008, which referred to adopting the model that the Scottish Executiveat that time a joint Labour and Liberal Democrat onewent down the road of some two and a half years ago. It is not exactly a new issue that has come out of the blue. On 4 December we had the European Court of Human Rights ruling that categorically stated that UK practice was out of line with that of the rest of Europe, and that it breached the European convention on human rights.
On 13 January I received the answer to a question that I had submitted to the Minister about whether the Secretary of State was considering introducing proposals on time limits for keeping various types of DNA sample, and on removal from the national DNA database of profiles of people who had never been convicted of an offence. According to the Ministers answer, much as he said in his opening statement, on 16 December the Secretary of State told the Intellect Technology Association that the Government were looking at those issues, that there would be a White Paper and a consultation, and that the Government would eventually introduce some proposals, which we were told today would happen by the summer. That is not acceptable, given how long the argument has been raging, and the amount of time the Government have known that the issue was coming along.
On Friday 20 February the holding clauses were submitted, but we could see them publicly only from Monday of this week. The Minister made a few welcome hints about what proposals might arriveon children, for examplebut they were no more than hints and suggestions. We will not know what the Government will propose in the measures until much later in the year. For us not to be able to debate the concrete substance of what the Government will or will not propose to do is absolutely unacceptable. It is entirely wrong and unsatisfactory to ask us to simply give the Government advance permission to introduce regulations that would not be subject to major debate, vote and amendment in the House but rather to the affirmative resolution procedure. That cannot be accepted on such an important and long-running issue, which the Government have known for a long time to be controversial.
The Government have grown the biggest database in the world. It has 4 million entries, which is 5 per cent. of the English and Welsh population, and the Government estimate that by 2010 there will be 4.5 million entries. There are 700,000 children aged under 18 on it, but many people who were entered on to the database as children will have now moved into adulthood. A question that I asked on 6 November 2008 produced the information that 98,017 people were under the age of 13, 442,375 were aged between 13 and 15 and 606,098 were between the ages of 16 and 18 when they were first entered on to the database. Huge numbers of young people are having personal information intrusively accumulated, and the European Court has judged that to be unacceptable. The database is bigger than the one in the USA, even though the USA has five times our population. That seems remarkable.
A quarter1 millionof those on the database have no police record. They were either arrested and never charged, or were charged but not convicted. Twenty-five per cent. of the people on the database are innocent in the eyes of the law. They are the people who everyone has been so concerned about. Two or three years ago, Scotland went down a different route and decided to remove the bulk of those people, with some exceptions which we will come to.
What sort of people go on to the database? Can we trust it? One example is three children who built a tree-house in a cherry tree and were arrested. Children building dens and tree-houses becomes a criminal offence that gets them on the DNA database for the rest of their lives. That seems remarkable. Another example is of a fight in a school. The teachers reported to the police the two people they thought were involved and a 14-year-old boy was wrongly identified by the teachers. DNA was taken and put on the database and although it was then explained that it was a case of mistaken identity, the chief constable refused to remove the DNA.
These are examples of people having their DNA put on the database for life, in the way the Government have accumulated it. What is the logic of that? The Government argue that the DNA database is very important in catching criminals and we heard the statistics at the start of the debate on these clauses. That is true. DNA is a great new weapon in helping to bring criminals to justice but it is never used as the sole piece of evidence to convict someone. There has to be other corroborative evidence.
If the Government say that DNA is so important that we should have all this informationthat we should grow the biggest DNA database in the worldlogic demands that it should include the whole population. If that cannot be done logistically, as has been explained to me by experts in the field, the next step would be to include every baby who is born. We will have all that for the future and build a database that way. The ethics group already mentioned said in its first annual report that the Government should make a formal announcement, and that they had failed to do so at that point. For various reasons set out in its detailed notes, it said:
A universal database is both impractical and socially undesirable. It would also be very expensive and of questionable value to improved policing.
So, above all, it would be undesirable, not just because of practical difficulties but for all sorts of ethical reasons. The Government fallback position might be to say that they just want to cast the net as widely as possible. I have heard it argued that people arrested in the vicinity of an incident, even though they are never charged or convicted, are likely to be the sort who would be criminals. The argument is that there is no smoke without fire, that they would not be there unless they were prone to that sort of behaviour. It is an appalling step for the state to imply that it is going back to a presumption of guilt without evidence, rather than the presumption of innocence unless proven guilty which is supposed to have underpinned British law for the past 800 years. The ethics group addressed that explicitly in light of the S and Marper judgment:
The ethics group remains convinced that the current policy for process and removal puts innocent individuals at a severe disadvantage which is at considerable variance with the principles of policing by consent.
Are the Government, by logic of their argument, saying we want the whole population because then we can catch all the criminals?
Mr. Campbellindicated dissent.

Paul Holmes: The Minister shakes his head. The Government may say, let us throw out the widest net in the democratic world and get as many people as possible, thanks to guilt by association, as there is no smoke without fire: somebody may have been named as a possible suspect, so we will keep their record. As for the 25 per cent. of people on the database who are innocentthat is 1 million people and growingwe will get them in the future because they are likely to be criminals. Is that really acceptable? We certainly do not think so, the Conservative party does not think so, and the ethics group does not think so. In Scotland, they said some years ago that they did not think so, and they have changed the law to take that into account. The European Court has said it is not acceptable. Most people would say that it is not acceptable. The Government ask what should be done about serious crimes that are detected. In fact, only 0.35 per cent. of serious crimes are detected as a result of information from the DNA database, which is a tiny fraction. That was true in 2004-05, and it was true in 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08.
Myths have been promulgated about the role that DNA has played in some famous convictions. Maninder Pal Singh Kohli was convicted in November 2008 of the rape and murder of 17-year-old Hannah Foster, and his case has been cited as an example in which the DNA database led to conviction. However, in fact, police investigations led to his van; Hannahs DNA was found in his van and DNA evidence corroborated evidence that police collected in the normal pursuit of policing. That is true of several other famous examples that keep being quoted in support of Government policy, including the case of Mark Dixie, who was recently convicted for the murder of Sally Ann Bowman. However, the DNA sample that led to the conviction was taken when he was arrested for violent affray in a pub nine months after the murder.
No one is arguing that the DNA of people who are arrested for that sort of offence should not be takenof course it should. If the person is not convicted, eventually their DNA sample should be removed. According to Scottish law, in cases where people are arrested on suspicion of a sex crime or a violent crimethe two issues that people are always concerned aboutthere should be provision to keep the DNA for three years and possibly to extend that by another two years if the chief constable thinks it appropriate, and we support that policy.
Mark Dixies DNA swab was taken after he was arrested for violent affray nine months after the murder for which he was eventually convicted. Under the type of system that we suggest should be introduced, which the Scottish Executive have enacted and the European Court of Human Rights is talking about, that DNA sample would still have been taken and would be run against the database. If nothing came up and he was never convicted or charged for the affray in the pub, the sample would be destroyed three or five years later, depending on the view of the chief constable. There are several other examples, such as Steve Wright and Peter Tobin, where the DNA sample that was already on the database did not lead directly to conviction but acted in a supporting or corroborative role for DNA that was taken legitimately and kept for some other incident, and that process would not be affected by our suggestions to adopt the Scottish practice.
The Courts ruling was clear. It accepted that the DNA profile and sample constituted personal data and should be protected by data protection laws. That was significant, because until now, the Information Commissioner in the UK has argued that DNA samples do not fall under UK data protection laws. However, the Court stated that a sample does, and should. The Court emphasised the truly sensitive nature of a DNA sample and described it as being of a highly personal nature, containing
substantial amounts of unique personal data,
so it was particularly intrusive to break that privacy. If we are to take that intrusive step, it ought to be because we have convicted someone of an offence, and not because they were arrested as a possible witness and we are just going to keep it forever because of a suspicion that one day it might come in handy, as is the case with a quarter of the people on the database. The Court stated that
the mere retention and storing of personal data by public authorities, however obtained, are to be regarded as having direct impact on the private-life interest of an individual concerned, irrespective of whether subsequent use is made of the data.
The Court ruling was strong and clear about what is wrong with Government policy.
The Scottish Executives legislation is relevant, because the Court stated that the practice in England and Wales, which allowed for the indefinite retention of the DNA and fingerprints of unconvicted people, breached the European convention on human rights. The Court also stated that it considered the current retention policy in Scotland for samples from those who are not convicted to be compliant with the convention. Therefore, there is leeway with the Scottish case, which the Court has stated fits in fine with the convention.
With regard to people who have been arrested on suspicion of violent or sexual offences but not convicted, their samples can be kept for three to five years under various conditions, which fits with the Courts approach. Otherwise, the DNA of innocent people who are not charged, or who are charged and not convicted, should be destroyed, and that is the line of argument that most rational people outside the Governments line of argument have taken, and that is the line or argument that western democracies take. It is the line of argument that part of the UK, Scotland, has taken and implemented successfully in law, and it is certainly the approach that we think should be taken.
The Government say that they will consult, issue a White Paper and come back later in the year, possibly in the summer, but the arguments have been well rehearsed. There has been much research and consultation in this country, in Scotland and in other places, and it is pretty extensive and satisfactory. In asking us to pass the new clauses, the Government are asking us simply to trust them. They are saying, We will get it right and will come back with the detail later this year, which you will not be able to amend, reject or throw out. You will have to like it or lump it, so trust us. Unfortunately, on this issue, we cannot do that because, as I say, the arguments have been very clearly put forward at great length by many people in recent years, and it is unacceptable to have a DNA databasethe biggest DNA database in the worldthat breaches European rights, when a quarter of the people on it are innocent. It is simply unacceptable to include them, on spec, on the basis that one day they might be guilty, so we should create as big a database as possible. We oppose that absolutely; it is simply unacceptable.

Alan Campbell: I begin by repeating the process that we are involved in. The GovernmentI put this on the record againare committed to complying with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. To some extent, the clock is ticking, in that we have a commitment to respond to that decision within 12 months. Whatever else may have been said, there is a definitive time scale here, which affects the process on which we have embarked.
We accept, as the Court judgment accepts, that there is public disquiet about the retention of DNA, but there is also, as the Court judgment also accepts, a strong case for using DNA for public protection. Furthermore, the Court judgment accepts that there should be a balance; I accept that there should be a balance. The difficulty is where does that balance lie? That is not an easy position to arrive at. We should not simply rush to arrive at a position and we should try to involve as many people in the process as possible.
The next stage of the process is to consult the public, then to introduce proposals later this year in legislation to allow Parliament, ultimately, to decide. The Government can introduce proposals, which will be based on that public consultation, but at the end of the day Parliament will decide. In case anyone is thinking of the argument, But of course the Government will get their way, I can assure that person that, judging from the Home Office questions that are tabled, the letters I receive and the opinions of colleagues who speak to me, there is a wide range of opinions about DNA. They are not all on one side of the House; they are on both sides of the House. Therefore, I welcome the opportunity to have a constructive debate.
Let me try to respond to the points made by the hon. Member for Hornchurch. I welcome his contribution to the debate and the way in which he made his comments. I do not agree with some of the things that he said, but I welcome his commitment to engage constructively. He suggested that we were somehow seeking to frustrate parliamentary consideration. I have just been through the process that we are involved in, and a key part of it is public consultation. I am quite sure that Members of Parliament will want to play a full part in that process outside Parliament. We are committed to introducing proposals in the autumn for Parliament to decide, but there are lots of other ways in which Parliament can make its views clear, not just in the public consultation but through the business of the House. There must be ample opportunity for people to watch this debate as it goes on and to be able to make the very points that the hon. Gentleman is making, not just to influence the consultation itself but the process. As for the parameters of the consultation, we need to think about Parliament in its wider sense, because this issue is one of the most important issues that we face.

James Brokenshire: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way and I am also grateful to him for making a commitment to public consultation, which I agree is absolutely essential. What I do not understand is why the Government appear to want to subject this matter to the regulation and order-making approach, because it would not then be possible for hon. Members to make amendments, even though, as he rightly indicates, there is a broad range of views and feelings on this very sensitive issue. If that mechanism of making amendments was allowed, it could aid the debate in the House on the detailed consideration of the Governments proposals, to ensure that each of those viewpoints can be considered, so that appropriate scrutiny can take place. I do not understand why the Government seem to have set their face against that approach.

Alan Campbell: I understand very well the points that the hon. Gentleman is making, and he makes them very well. They are important points, but they relate to what I just saidnamely that Parliament can play an important part in the process of helping to shape the consultation and its outcome.
At the end of the day, however, if the hon. Gentleman is questioning the process, because he thinks that the Government will introduce proposals anyway and those proposals cannot be amended, it is valid to ask, why go through this process? Why bother having a process at all? Why not just respond simply to what the ECHR has said? Why have a public consultation and make it such an important issue for public debate? Why am I telling the hon. Gentleman that there are mechanisms in Parliament to debate such matters? Let him talk to his business managers about how they use their time in Parliament to see whether they can use some of it on the issue. If it is that important, why do they not do that? There will be a vote, after all.

Simon Burns: The Minister was a Government Whip so he understands that we can have as much consultation as we like in Parliament, but if the Government of the day are determined to do something, they will use their majority to force the matter through regardless.

Alan Campbell: Yes, and I have told the hon. Member for Chesterfield that there is a wide range of opinion on both sides of the House. It would be wrong for the Government to assume that, if they introduce the proposals to which he objects, there would not be objections from their own side. It is important that, first of all, we have a debate and a consultation, and that the Government listen to what is said, before introducing the measures. The hon. Member for Hornchurch is, of course, correct in saying that, if the measures are introduced as a statutory instrument, it will not be possible to amend them. He will also know, however, that a statutory instrument can be voted down.

Simon Burns: Come on.

Alan Campbell: If the measures are, as the hon. Gentleman says, so out of touch with what the hon. Member for Chesterfield calls the majority of people, what makes him think that the Government side would support such a thing?

Simon Burns: With respect, I will repeat what I said earlier. The Minister was a Government Whip, so he knows what he is talking about. Government members of a Committee dealing with controversial statutory instruments will be hand-picked in order for the Government to get their majority, unless the Government Whips Office makes a mistake.

Alan Campbell: I do not recognise that process at all, so I could not possibly comment. The hon. Gentleman knows, however, that what happens in Committee is not the end of the story. A statutory instrument is not just a matter of what happens in Committee; it is actually a matter for Parliament. Furthermore, it is not just a matter for the House of Commons, but for the other place, too. The hon. Gentleman should not be so cynical about the way in which Parliament works and the opportunities for scrutiny.
Mr. Burnsrose

Alan Campbell: I want to move on before we exhaust this particular point.

Simon Burns: On the point about cynicism, the Labour party has been in government for 12 years now, and its control freakery over its own members surpasses that of the Thatcher Government. The Minister is slightly disingenuous if he is suggesting that members of statutory instrument Committees are not hand-picked. He knows in his heart of hearts that I am telling the truth when I say that they are hand-picked to minimise any danger to the Government majority.

Hugh Bayley: I should stop this particular debate, because the way in which the Whips operate is not relevant to the Bill. The point has been well made by the hon. Gentleman, but the Minister should return to the new clause.

Alan Campbell: Thank you, Mr. Bayley. The hon. Member for West Chelmsford knows that I did not comment on what he just said. I did not make that point at all.

James Brokenshire: May I make a final point on this process? The Government regularly introduce White Papers that result in primary legislation. That then allows consideration in detail and debates on the Floor of the House. While I respect the fact that Adjournment and Opposition debates can take place in advance to allow issues to be articulated as part of the consultation, the requirement for detailed scrutiny to ensure that the Governments provisions are acceptable only comes into being when a set of proposals are introduced. The Government seem to be shying away from that scrutiny, and that is why I am concerned about the process that has been adopted, which means that we might not get the end result that the Minister promises.

Alan Campbell: I quite understand that point, because the hon. Gentleman raised it when he questioned why this is not being done through primary legislation. I will come back to point in a moment, but first let me address some of the other comments that he made.
The hon. Gentleman and I agree on the need to strike a balance between public protection and the right to privacyso, too, did the judgment. I also accept his point about accepting the responsibility of being a country at the cutting edge in having a DNA database, which makes it more important that we act in a responsible waythat almost goes without saying. He mentioned, as the hon. Member for Chesterfield did, the reference to young children. The Home Secretary signalled, in her speech in December 2008, that children under the age of 10 will be removed from the database and that process is well underwayin fact it is nearing completion. She added that we want to have people on the database who are guilty of the most serious offences, and make sure that people who are in prison for such offences are on the database. Again, I give a commitment that that process is underway.
Much has been made of the Governments intention to expand the database as much as possibleI think that that was the phrase that was usedand whether that meant that it would become a repository of the whole nations DNA. If the Government, or indeed Parliament, had not set a threshold, perhaps there would be a better case for making that point. However, the reality is that there is a threshold, which is set at the point of people being arrested and detained in a police station. The relevant point is that the European Court of Human Rights did not accept that that was the appropriate place for the thresholdit says that the threshold is in the wrong place. That is what the whole debate is about. If it says that it is in the wrong place and we have to comply with that judgment, then what do we do not just to comply with that judgment, but to assure ourselves that the threshold we put in place is appropriate and proportionate?

James Brokenshire: I come back to the quote from the Court judgment on the intention of the policy about
the sole reason being to increase the size and, therefore, the use of the database.
Can the Minister confirm whether the arguments before the Court were made on that basis, because it gets to the nub of the issues that I have highlighted and the issues raised subsequently by the hon. Member for Chesterfield?

Alan Campbell: Part of the argument that was made was to try and counter the argument that the two individuals should have their samples removed from the database. Of course, part of the counter-argument is to justify why people are on the database in the first place: it is about the public need for people to be on that database and how it is being used.
As I was saying, the Governments policy is not to try and do everything we can, in any way possible, to increase the size of the database. I agree, that if that was the case, one could extrapolate and say, Why not go down the route of having everybody on a database? We have set a threshold. The fact that the Court disagrees with the threshold means that we have to address that particular point, but if we were simply going down the route of getting as many people as possible on to that database, why would we have a threshold and why would we not introduce some idea of compulsion and make it mandatory? We have to have some sense of balance about what the Government are trying to achieve. What is clear from the discussion that we are having this afternoon is that the hon. Member for Chesterfield and I disagree fundamentally about the size and the necessity of the DNA database.

Paul Holmes: I do not disagree fundamentally about the necessity of the database; I disagree fundamentally about the necessity of having 25 per cent. of the people on it who are innocent. Having guilty people on there is fine, but it is not fine to have innocent people on there.

Alan Campbell: I apologise to the hon. Gentleman, almost as I said it I thought that I was getting into the wrong place, so I am happy to apologise on the record.
I will return to that point in my response to the hon. Gentleman. He raises points that will be raised in the public and parliamentary debate on the nature and scale of the DNA database. That will allow us to not only comply with the judgment, but point a way forward.
The hon. Member for Hornchurch raised a number of specific points. He asked how many samples have been given voluntarily. I am still waiting for the number but I will get it to him as soon as possible. He also asked if the White Paper will address volunteer samples. Yes, it will, particularly ensuring that the volunteer is made fully aware of their rights.
The hon. Gentleman asked if there were any proposals to cover non-notifiable offences. No. He raised a point about individuals knowing what information on them is held and if that issue will be included in the White Paper. The White Paper will emphasise the importance of informing a person of their rights and entitlements. We have already indicated in the consultation paper on the PACE review, published in August 2008, that we will raise the awareness and understanding of the public and detainees.
The hon. Gentleman raised points and questions that, frankly, are more about the debate that will need to take place than the issue that we are discussing, which is whether the Home Secretary should be given the power to bring forward proposals that Parliament can decide upon after public consultation. I welcome that wide public debate and hope that hon. Members also welcome it, but emphasise that Parliament will make the final decision.
On data sharing and the Prum treaty, in one sense, the hon. Gentleman is correct in saying that there will be what could be described as an exchange of profiles. However, it is not about another signatory to the treaty being able to access the database and sharing responsibility for it, in case anyone gets that impression. It is about whether they can request samples and whether we agree to share them in specified circumstances. I hope that that reassures the Committee.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned familial links. They are an important aspect of identifying potential suspects, as well as the innocent. We will publish proposals in the White Paper on the use of DNA, but we do not envisage it extending beyond the current uses set out in PACE.
The hon. Gentleman made a point about primary legislation, which I promised to come back to. I started by saying the we are involved in a process and that the judgment made in December in the European Court of Human Rights set a clock ticking. There were options for looking at the issue and for complying within the 12-month time scale. We decided that we would begin work on it but would also involve the public. I will come on to the hon. Gentlemans point about why we did not do it sooner. I believe that involving the public strengthens our case for when we go back to Europe and argue that we have complied with the judgment. It helps to clarify, in our mind, what the future rules should be, and helps us to make our case in Europe.
What would the alternative have been? Would it have been that, after December, we, as a Government, drew up proposals, which would have to have been consulted on anyway, brought them to Parliament at some point and had primary legislation, which would have had to be scrutinized in the way that he talked aboutan alternative system, but scrutinized in that manner? He has been in Parliament long enough to understand. Does he seriously believe that we could have completed that process and complied with the judgment? I cannot agree with him. That is a difficulty of operating within the time scale. We had to make a choice and we have made the right one.

Paul Holmes: On that point, the Government have created this hole for themselves and they should stop digging. They have had ample opportunity to consider this issue. It has been discussed in Parliament before. Another model has been tried and tested in Scotland. If clauses on gangs can be tabled and brought forward for discussion in such a short period and included in primary legislation, the same could be done on DNA.

Alan Campbell: I am disappointed that the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that we should short-circuit the system by using primary legislation to rebalance the matter. That would short-circuit the public consultation that we are signed up to. We have not hidden away and then brought forward a series of proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have opened up the debate to ensure that we get to a position of compliance. We have also ensured that we can be much more confident in the way the database is used in the future. He keeps referring to the Scottish model. Let us talk about that as part of the consultation. He can bring forward that model as part of his argument for reforming the methods.
The hon. Gentleman said that the Government should bring forward amendments at this stage and that we should not be surprised by the judgment. The Government did not expect that judgment in December 2008, in part because when it was discussed in our system there was a unanimous decision in the House of Lords. How could we have been expected to believe that the European Court of Human Rights would make that decision? Having decided to fight the case in Europe because we believed passionately that it was the right case to make, what signal would we have sent had we started making the changes that would be needed if the decision went against us? That would have been a strange case of putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, I do not accept the argument that we should not be surprised. We were surprised and disappointed because that outcome was not expected.

Paul Holmes: I made a dual point. First, the Government should not have been surprised, partly because we were so out of kilter with the rest of the democratic world. Secondly, having been surprised, they should realise the arguments have been well rehearsed over a long period. If the Government could bring forward clauses for primary legislation on gangs so quickly in response to the court judgment on the Birmingham case, why could the same not have been done on DNA? This is a well-rehearsed argument.

Alan Campbell: The hon. Gentleman started his remarks by stating how important this issue is. I hope that he also accepts that it is a complex issue. As I told him, the Home Secretary said in December 2008 that children under 10 would be taken off the database. I have assured him that a lot of work has been done on that, but that it has not yet been completed. There are a small number of cases. It is not a case of going to the database and simply taking them off. Many of these cases are complex. Taking them off can be justified, but often there is also a reason for leaving them on.
The hon. Gentleman underestimates the complexity of the case in saying that we should have proposals for primary legislation in February in response to a judgment that was made in December. As I keep saying to him, to do so would write out the other part of the equation that we want to see, which is a full and proper debate. That was part of the judgment in December. The court accepted that there was public concern and that, by implication, there should be public debate.

Paul Holmes: Could the Minister explain what that complexity is? I am not talking just about children under the age of 10, which is one of the lowest ages of criminal responsibility in the democratic world, but about children from 10 to 18. The matter is not complex. If they have been charged and convicted, they should stay on the database. If they have not been charged or have been charged and found innocent, they should be taken off it. The only complexity relates to a small section at the bottom end of the database made up of under-10s who are below the age of criminal responsibility.

Alan Campbell: I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman has started to raise exceptions. Once one gets into what looks like a very straightforward principle exceptions often emerge. It is often more complex than he suggests. He himself, in raising issues that were part of amendments that were not selected, started to put conditions. He started to describe the sort of areas where exceptions would be made. When we start on that process it is anything but easy. Other factors often need to be taken into consideration.

James Brokenshire: The Minister has given us various reasons why the Government are proceeding down this route. He sets great store by the need for public consultation and public engagement, which I do not necessarily deny, albeit that I disagree with his analysis of what primary legislation can do. However, can he tell us what form he envisages the public consultation will take?

Alan Campbell: I cannot give a definitive answer to that. I do not think that the hon. Gentleman really expected me to say that I could. This is work in progress. We are committed to bringing forward a White Paper. I have told him, because some of them grow out of the judgment itself, the sort of areas that we will be looking at. He is well aware of the kind of issues that are involved here. We will have a full consultation with the public on this matter.
James Brokenshireindicated dissent.

Alan Campbell: The hon. Gentleman shakes his head. But in an earlier debate when we talked about consultation on the mandatory code on alcohol I gave him a commitment that we would share information about who was part of the pre-consultation and what the issues were at a very early stage. If the hon. Gentleman does not have that information he will get it extremely shortly. I can also tell him that there will be a full consultation on that practice. Could he give us the benefit of the doubt and accept that if a Minister stands up and says, There will be a full consultation on this matter, we will stick to our word? I cannot, of course, tell him exactly what the consultation will be, but I am sure that if he and others find that it is not extensive enough they will seek to make it so. We want the fullest, widest consultation.
Let me return to the other comments that the hon. Member for Chesterfield made. He raised some pretty fundamental issues. Can we trust the database? Why is it so large? Why should some people be on it and others be off it? Those are precisely the issues that the consultation will look at and Parliament will decide upon. But he and others are in danger of ignoring the other side of the argument. Of the 200,000 profiles that would not have been on the register had things taken a different route, 6,290 were from people involved in 14,000 offences, including 114 murders and 116 rapes.
We all get e-mails from people asking how they can get off the register and why people should hold data on them. But we have a responsibility in this House to think about the other side. We have to think about the families of people who have been murdered and raped and the families of people who have been exonerated by the use of this database. If we had gone down the route that the hon. Gentleman suggested at an earlier stage it would simply not be available to us.

Simon Burns: I am impressed by the Ministers impassioned plea on behalf of the victims of crime, but there is another side to the coin. What about those people who are innocent who have given their DNA and are then not charged because they are innocent? Why should they have their DNA on a register when they are totally innocent?

Alan Campbell: That is precisely what the Court issue was all about. That is why the Government are bringing forward not just consultation but proposals to change the threshold. We will address that issue. The point I am making is that one cannot make that argument on the one hand and then dismiss the usefulness of the DNA database. It plays a very important part in policing in this country. I got the impression from listening to the hon. Member for Chesterfield that if he is not careful he will not only underestimate but underplay the importance of the database. He listed, twice, organisations that can tell us that we have got it wrong. He talked a great deal about Scotland, but Scotland has a different system and a devolved Government, as he well knows. It does not have to be the same south of the border as it is north of it. He not only gave a list of people whom we should be listening towhom we will listen tobut said that the majority of people, and most rational people, certainly agree with him. He might be right, but we will test that by letting the public have their say. Let us have a public consultation. Going down the hon. Gentlemans route and looking at his prescription would have denied the public their say. Let us get a sense of balance here. I welcome a public consultation but I do not have the confidence in the hon. Gentlemans position that he has.

Paul Holmes: Will the Minister give way?

Alan Campbell: Not at the moment, because I do not want to end on a discordant note. The hon. Gentleman introduced a series of amendments that were not accepted, and for obvious reasons I do not wish to dwell on that. However, I welcome such amendments being tabled because the ideas they contain are precisely the sort of things that should help to form our debate. I very much welcome what the hon. Gentleman has said.

Paul Holmes: As I said in what I think was my opening sentence on the issue, DNA has been a fantastic advance in helping to catch criminals. It should, however, never be used without corroborating evidence. In only 0.35 per cent. of convictions based on DNA is the DNA of the innocent 25 per cent. of the 4 million people on the database used. That is a very tiny percentage. I hope that in the promised public consultation the Government uses the stats and not emotive headlines. I gave four examples, two in detail, of people who are often quoted by the Government as evidence that having innocent peoples DNA on the database leads to convictions, for murder and so on. That was not the case in my two detailed examples. I hope that the consultation will be based on genuine facts and not on saying that having all those innocent people on the database is essential to catching all these criminals. That is not effective in 99.65 per cent. of cases.

Alan Campbell: Before I finish my remarks, I say to the hon. Gentleman that the judgment in the European Court of Human Rights was not that innocent peoples DNA could not be retained. It placed conditions on retention, stating circumstances in which DNA could be retained. What I have tried to say throughout this debate is that the Government will respond to the European Court of Human Rights. We will comply with it, and in doing so the threshold will change.
This is an appropriate opportunity to look at the wide issue. The hon. Members for Chesterfield and for Hornchurch have both accepted that there is widespread public concern and the need for a debate. We have discussed the issue for some time; it is a regular at questions and it is often raised in Home Office debates. So, let us have that debate. Our proposal is the best way, within the time scale that the judgment gives us, to get the balance right between the rights of the individual, which the court case highlighted, and the rights of the rest of the community to be safe and be kept safe. Part of that is having and using a DNA database. Despite all that has been said, we think that our new clauses are the correct way forward.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to.

New clause 33 added to the Bill.

New Clause 34

Retention and destruction of samples etc: service offences
(1) Section 113 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60) (application to armed forces) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (1) insert
(1A) The Secretary of State may by order make provision as to the retention, use and destruction of material obtained in connection with the investigation of a service offence which is equivalent to the provision made by regulations under section 64B, subject to such modifications as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(3) In subsection (3) after paragraph (a) insert
(aa) the exercise of functions conferred by an order under subsection (1A); or.
(4) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (3) apply in relation to material obtained before or after the commencement of this section..(Mr. Campbell.)

This amendment would allow equivalent provision to be made to that under the power in amendment NC33, in relation to service offences as defined in the Armed Forces Act 2006.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to.

New clause 34 added to the Bill.

New Clause 35

Retention and destruction of samples etc: Northern Ireland
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/3141 (N.I. 12)) is amended as follows.
(2) After Article 64A insert
64B Retention and destruction of samples etc
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision as to the retention, use and destruction of material to which this Article applies.
(2) This Article applies to the following material
(a) photographs falling within a description specified in the regulations,
(b) fingerprints taken from a person in connection with the investigation of an offence,
(c) impressions of footwear so taken from a person,
(d) DNA and other samples so taken from a person,
(e) information derived from DNA samples so taken from a person.
(3) The regulations may
(a) make different provision for different cases, and
(b) make provision subject to such exceptions as the Secretary of State thinks fit.
(4) The regulations may frame any provision or exception by reference to an approval or consent given in accordance with the regulations.
(5) The regulations may confer functions on persons specified or described in the regulations.
(6) The functions which may be conferred by virtue of paragraph (5) include those of
(a) providing information about the operation of regulations made under this Article,
(b) keeping their operation under review,
(c) making reports to the Secretary of State about their operation, and
(d) making recommendations to the Secretary of State about the retention, use and destruction of material to which this Article applies.
(7) The regulations may make provision for and in connection with establishing a body to discharge the functions mentioned in paragraph (6)(b) to (d).
(8) The regulations may make provision amending, repealing, revoking or otherwise modifying any provision made by or under an Act or Northern Ireland legislation (including this Order).
(9) The provision which may be made by virtue of paragraph (8) includes amending or otherwise modifying any provision so as to impose a duty or confer a power to make an order, regulations, a code of practice or any other instrument.
(10) The regulations may make
(a) supplementary, incidental or consequential provision, or
(b) transitional, transitory or saving provision.
(11) For the purposes of this Article
(a) photograph includes a moving image, and
(b) the reference to a DNA sample is a reference to any material that has come from a human body and consists of or includes human cells.
(3) In Article 89 (procedure for orders and regulations) for Article 29(4) or 46A substitute Articles 29(4), 46A and 64B.
(4) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (3) apply in relation to material obtained before or after the commencement of this section..(Mr. Campbell.)

This amendment would amend the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 to allow equivalent provision to be made to that under the power in amendment NC33, in relation to Northern Ireland.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to.

New clause 35 added to the Bill.

New Clause 1

Community punishments for graffiti and fly-posting
After section 43 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 (c.38) insert
43A Community punishments for graffiti and fly-posting
(1) Where an authorised officer of a local authority has reason to believe that a person has committed a relevant offence in the area of that authority, he may give that person a notice offering him the opportunity of discharging any liability to conviction for that offence by the completion of a community service punishment in accordance with the notice.
(2) But an authorised officer may not give a notice under subsection (1) if he considers that the commission of the offence
(a) in the case of a relevant offence falling within section 44(1)(c), also involves the commission of an offence under section 30 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37) (racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage), or
(b) in the case of any other relevant offence, was motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility
(i) towards a person based upon his membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group, or
(ii) towards the members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group.
(3) In the case of a relevant offence falling within section 44(1)(f), an authorised officer may not give a notice to a person under subsection (1) in relation to the display of an advertisement unless he has reason to believe that that person personally affixed or placed the advertisement to, against or upon the land or object on which the advertisement is or was displayed.
(4) Where a person is given a notice under subsection (1) in respect of an offence
(a) no proceedings may be instituted for that offence (or any other relevant offence arising out of the same circumstances) before the expiration of the period of 14 days following the date of the notice, and
(b) he may not be convicted of that offence (or any other relevant offence arising out of the same circumstances) if before the expiration of that period he agrees in writing to undertake the community punishment in accordance with the notice.
(5) A notice under subsection (1) must give such particulars of the circumstances alleged to constitute the offence as are necessary for giving reasonable information of the offence.
(6) A notice under subsection (1) must also state
(a) the period during which, by virtue of subsection (4), proceedings will not be instituted for the offence,
(b) the number of hours which the person is required to work, which shall not exceed 24,
(c) the period during which the hours must be worked, provided that it shall not commence more than two months from the date on which the notice is agreed to under subsection (4)(b), and
(d) the officer of a provider of probation services or, in the case of a person aged under 18, the member of a youth offending team to whom the person must report, and the time by which he must so report.
(7) The authorised officer issuing the notice under subsection (1) must give a copy of the notice to the officer specified in accordance with subsection (6)(d) to whom the person must report and any other information relating to the case which he considers likely to be of assistance.
(8) A notice under subsection (1) must be in such form as the appropriate person may by order prescribe.
(9) The provisions of section 47 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c. 6) (obligations of person subject to community punishment order) shall apply in respect of a community punishment notice.
(10) For the purposes of this section a police officer or police community support officer shall have the same powers to issue notices..(Paul Holmes.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Paul Holmes: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The essence of the new clause is in the first paragraph: that an authorised officer of a local authority who has reason to believe that a person has committed the relevant offencethat is, graffiti or fly-postingcan give that person the opportunity of discharging any liability to prosecution and conviction if they undertake community-service punishment to rectify the damage they have caused, to remove the graffiti or the fly-posting to make it good.
There are two purposes in suggesting this. The first is that it is a reflection of the well known and well debated broken-window theory, which became fashionable in New York, for example, in the early 1990s when the new mayor suggested seizing back public places and getting the police to tackle what had been regarded as trivial in the past when they had had to concentrate on more serious things. The theory was that if the abandoned cars, litter, fly-posting and graffiti were dealt with, it would help to reduce more serious crime. Arguably, in New York it had that effect, although analysts point out that the number of police also doubled, which was already higher per head of population than in European countries. Another factor was that the population was getting older and, of course, a lot of this type of crime is committed predominantly by young people who grow out of that pattern of low-level criminality. There are all sorts of reasons why it might have worked but it is certainly argued that the New York example could signpost the way.
Anyone who has served on a local council or worked with one will know that the same principle applies. If the council tackles outbreaks of graffiti promptly it is much less likely to continue or recur in that area. Whereas, if it is allowed to perpetuate it creates a vicious cycle. As a teacher would know, exactly the same applies with regard to graffiti on displays of workthe sharper the school cracks down on it, the less it happens.
The broken-window theory is well known although it had never really been scientifically and rationally researched. However, an article in Science magazine published on 12 December 2008 describes a number of controlled field experiments in a European country that tested the theory. For example, an alley was made pristine but it did not have a litter bin. To get rid of litter one would have to take it away or throw it on the floor. When the alley was clean people would almost universally take the litter away with them. When the alley was already littered they almost universally dropped the litter on the floor. A series of experiments was carried out. In another, a letter clearly containing €5 was left on the floor near a postbox. When the surrounding area was clean the number of people who stole the envelope rather than push it into the postbox was tiny. When the postbox and the small amount of money hanging out of the letter were in an area that had been deliberately graffitied, the number of people taking the envelope and the money rose considerably. The researchers did about five different experiments that led to the same result.
The research concluded that there is a clear message for policy makers and police officers: early disorder diagnosis and intervention are vital in fighting the spread of disorder. Signs of inappropriate behaviour such as graffiti and broken windows lead to other inappropriate behaviour such as littering and stealing. The result is a decline in social norms and accepted standards, which leads to an escalation in littering, crime and so on. That suggests that there is hard evidence that the broken-window theory works, which backs up the famous New York example and the anecdotal evidence that we can all give from personal experience. That explains one purpose of the proposal.
The second purpose is to take a stance that criminalises fewer people. England and Wales send a higher proportion of the population to jail than any other European country. Is that effective? Most people who do graffiti and fly-posting are under the age of 18, although not all. England and Wales jail more children than any other western European country and 76 per cent. of those children reoffend within one year of being released. Clearly that policy is not working.
I have visited the prison systems in Norway and Canada, which are held up as models of the opposite approach. An approach that does not criminalise children early on for relatively minor offences has a more beneficial effect alongside other measures such as intervention, counselling and help. I am told that 40 per cent. of under-25s have a criminal record of some kind, although most are quite trivial. The evidence is that the more people are criminalised through court proceedings, the more criminal they tend to become. It is a self-feeding cycle.
As well as helping to tackle the broken-window theory, the second purpose of the proposal is to take a less criminalising approach with people undertaking restorative justice, which all three main parties have talked much about over recent years. Some good experiments around the country have shown how that can work.
People can be told that we have the evidence for an antisocial behaviour order or court proceedings, but that we are giving them a chance to clear up the mess they have made. They could thereby discharge any liability or prosecution. A magistrate friend of mine said that that would bypass the magistrates court. That is the whole point. At the early, low-level stage we should try not to put people in the criminal system and get them to clean up the mess they have made.
Does the proposal give too much power to local authority officials? Again, the point is that if the offender says that they do not want to clean up the mess, the evidence can be used under the normal legal procedures. If the individual says that it was them and that they will rectify the vandalism, graffiti or fly-posting, there is restorative justice for the community, the broken-window theory is tackled and the person is kept off the first rung on the ladder of criminality.
I am sure that the Minister will be able to pick holes in the proposals. I do not have the banks of Government draftsmen who could produce a far superior version. I would be delighted if the Minister said that the proposal will not work, but that he will take the idea and come back with something better. I do not intend to press the clause to a vote, but I am interested in the Ministers response.

James Brokenshire: The hon. Gentlemans point about the importance of focusing on graffiti is relevant. There is a debate about designing out crime. So much can and should be done to make our communities look cleaner, such as ensuring that they are well lit. Aspects of design can assist in ensuring that areas are safer and that less crime is committed. He is right that we should consider the concept of the broken-window society. If an area looks unsafe or unkept, in some ways the problem becomes self-perpetuating and the crime arises. Sadly, we have obviously seen this in many different communities that we have had involvement with.
There are two points. There is also the cost to businesses and small shops that perhaps have their shutters or their buildings continually defaced by graffiti. That highlights that graffiti is not an insignificant crime. So many businesses really struggle, because after the first occurrence they perhaps cannot get the insurance to pay to deal with the problem. The viability of certain secondary or tertiary shopping areas, including the shops that have had to withstand some of these problems, becomes quite marginal. Those shops feel the direct cost, particularly when local authorities understandably say, Well, you havent cleared this up and were going to issue you with a notice to clear it up, because it is contributing to the area feeling less safe. That puts real pressure on a number of those businesses. I am sure that many hon. Members will have experienced that situation in their own community.
I understand and recognise the points that the hon. Gentleman makes about the importance of not criminalising young people and not drawing them into the criminal justice system at too early a stage. However, if someone is going round tagging and creating graffiti, that is really quite important, because it can be the precursor to other offending. By simply saying that an officer of the local authority would effectively deal with graffiti, there is a risk that these offences will be viewed as less serious if they are taken outside of their current remit. In no way am I suggesting that the hon. Gentleman is making that point, because he is not.
I absolutely agree that restorative justice can demonstrate to a community that somebody is paying for the crime that they have committed, that they are seen publicly in their community to be either repainting a building or clearing up litter, and that people recognise that somebody has received a punishment in those circumstances. However, I fear that an unintended consequence of what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting may be that graffiti is seen as less of a crime and less of a threat to a particular community, because it would obviously then be for the local authority to try to arrange the community punishments. That would take the local authority into a realm that it is perhaps not so familiar with, albeit that partnership arrangements could be established with youth offending teams and that whole aspect of the system.
There are significant issues and potential problems with what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting. Furthermore, if we recall the debate that we had this morning about gangs, some gangs may use tags as a mean of identifying territory, so that there is a more sinister aspect to the use of graffiti. We can talk about graffiti being a mark on a wall, but sometimes, as the hon. Gentleman will know, those tags mean something; they can have links to more serious offending. That is why the approach of involving the police, who often log these tags and have a database of them so that they can tie that graffiti to other offending, is quite important.

Paul Holmes: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that there is a quite clear distinction and it would be at the designated officers discretion to establish that distinction? He would be working with the community disorder reduction partnerships and the police. Clearly, if it is serial tagging, gang tags or that sort of issue, why would the officer adopt this approach, unless they thought that it was appropriate for somebody just to get involved? If it is somebody who has just been caught spray-painting or chalking on a wall for the first time that we know of, why start to go through the heavy-handed legal procedures? So the decision would be at the discretion of the relevant officer. Clearly, if it was a serious matter, such as a serial offender or repeat offender, this approach would obviously not be appropriate.

James Brokenshire: It is interesting that the hon. Gentleman talks about the discretion of the relevant officer in this situation. I would argue that there should be discretion for the relevant police officer in how they deal with community safety and with offences in their community. It may be the case that an officer in the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman has indicated might, on a one-off occasion because he knows the person responsible and is very familiar with them, seek to exercise discretion in a particular way. I am just suggesting to the hon. Gentleman that that might be a better route in terms of being reasonable and dealing appropriately with offences in the community. There needs to be discretion and judgment on the part of police officers in these circumstances and that may be an appropriate way to address this problem, through the increasing use of community policing and safer neighbourhood teams, which I wholeheartedly support, who have a clearer understanding of the communities and neighbourhoods that they are policing.

Sally Keeble: My reading of this, and one reason why I think that it would not work, is that it involves
an authorised officer of a local authority
not a police officer, but a council officer. The person has to confess to the council officer that they have done it. It starts a new hare in the criminal justice system. That is why I have difficulty envisaging how a local council officer could be made to use a legal procedure such as this against a kid who is doing graffiti. It is an issue for the police officer, not the council cleaner.

James Brokenshire: I hear clearly what the hon. Lady says, but, as she should notice, I have talked about the discretion of police officers, working in conjunction with local authorities, which have a key role in the crime and disorder reduction partnerships that the hon. Member for Chesterfield alluded to. I have been to parts of the country where, for example, community police teams work hand in hand with council enforcement officers. Therefore, a combination of council-related issuesclear-up or using local environmental protection byelawsand working with the police creates a partnership approach. That is almost an alternative model that could be adopted and, in many ways, could achieve some of the elements that the hon. Gentleman seeks.

Paul Holmes: On the partnership approach, are hon. Members aware of the pretty widespread practice, not only in Chesterfield, but also across the country, of council officers working with the police on many issues? Sometimes, the council officers take the initiative. In Chesterfield, we have a system of rangers who go around the parks and housing estates tackling graffiti and working with the police on offenders. If the offenders are council tenants, they will serve notices or warnings on them. There are already working examples of council officers taking the initiative on such issues. The policethe beat officerand the council tenant liaison officer will visit a problem family together. The police will say, Well, if you dont get your act together, these are the legal outcomes and the tenant liaison officer will say, And you can be evicted as well. That double act works very well. This is not new ground; it is already happening to varying degrees.

James Brokenshire: I hear what the hon. Gentleman says, and I support close partnership working among the police, local authorities, probation teams and the NHS to address the issues in our communities. We see success where strong partnership elements are working. However, I question the necessity for the new clause in terms of where the relative responsibilities for dealing with the issues should lie. In my judgment, we are talking about criminal offences and if we want to debate young people in the criminal justice system, this is not necessarily the way to do it, although it is a valid point.
Going back to intelligence and potentially gang-related tags, the hon. Gentleman talked about the discretion of the officer, but, in reality, the police maintain the database of tags from photographic evidence and are better able to match them up. Would the local authority officer be in a position to make a judgment or use discretion? They would not necessarily have all the information at their fingertips. Equally, there is a cost impact on local authorities if they take on a new enforcement and community punishment role that is not currently envisaged for them.
The hon. Gentleman made an interesting point and, although I am not convinced, highlighting the impact of graffiti on our neighbourhoods and communities is relevant and valid, but I am not sure that this is the right way to approach it.

Alan Campbell: I thank the hon. Members for Chesterfield and for Birmingham, Yardley (John Hemming) for drawing this issue to the Committees attention, because this is an interesting amendment. When I discussed the proposal with my ministerial colleagues, we thought that there might be something in it. I cannot guarantee the hon. Member for Chesterfield that I will delight him, but I might give him a tiny bit of pleasure.
We have wide agreement on the broken-window theory, but I assure the hon. Gentleman, in view of his comments, that we all take those matters seriously, because graffiti and fly-posting are serious matters that can blight areas. It is right that the appropriate authorities react quickly to them and use enforcement powers when necessary. However, he begins to bring us into a more general debate on keeping young people out of the criminal justice system at an early stage, and he and I have some agreement on that.
I also agree with the points made by the hon. Member for Hornchurch on the need to be careful before going down that route. Making such a change or going too far down that route would send out a message to the individuals who might get involved in that kind of activity and the wider community. The community expects that graffiti and fly-posting will be put right by someone, and it is best put right by the perpetrators rather than at the expense of the council tax payer or anyone else. I want to say briefly where I think the Government are in that debate and reassure the hon. Gentleman of some of the things we are doing.

Paul Holmes: Before the Minister embarks on that explanation, which might be a direct answer to this question, I would like to say that we have already been in that territory to some degree in our debate on community payback. I remember visiting one group of people doing community payback in Chesterfield. One individual was in the army and his career would have ended if he had had to go to prison for those nine days, but the community payback allowed him to avoid that. There were other people in the group who would have lost their jobs if they had gone to prison for a very short spell, which actually has no beneficial effect with regard to crime and punishment. Several people I talked to in that group said community payback had been really helpful and avoided criminalising them. Those were adults rather than children or under-18s, so this is extending the same principle to an even lower level.

Alan Campbell: I remind the hon. Gentleman that restorative justice is already embedded in the youth justice system, and we are constantly looking at what more can be done to make it more widely available to avoid some of the scenarios to which he has rightly drawn the Committees attention.
With regard to the measures already in place, the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 introduced fixed penalty notices as an alternative to prosecution for certain types of environmental crime, including graffiti and fly-posting offences and, we believe, offers an effective and less burdensome alternative to prosecution. Fixed penalty notices for graffiti and fly-posting offences can currently be issued by local authorities, the police and police community support officers who have been designated by their chief officers.
One of the difficulties with the new clause and the further introduction of community service punishments is that it would have implications, not least for cost, a point to which the hon. Member for Chesterfield alluded. For example, what about the practical and funding problems for probation services or anyone tasked with ensuring that the community service was carried out? It also runs counter to the current focus on unpaid work in community service that is often directed towards highly visible work projects for offenders convicted of relatively more serious offences, and I use the word relatively because I do not underestimate how serious graffiti and fly-posting can be.
Other out-of-court disposals are available to address that kind of behaviour. For example, adult conditional cautions allow low-level, low-risk and mainly first-time offenders in uncontested cases to be offered a caution with conditions attached. The conditions must either be reparative, such as the payment of compensation to a victim or unpaid work, or rehabilitative, to address the root causes of the offending behaviour. Later this year, we will begin testing the youth conditional caution. The youth restorative disposal is also currently being piloted, which will allow low-level, low-risk, first-time young offenders to undertake reparation for those types of offences and similarly enable their conviction to be discharged if completed.
The idea brought forward by the hon. Member for Chesterfield is interesting. I am sure that we have not heard the last of it. I reassure him and other Committee members that we are satisfied that we have a comprehensive range of disposals available and do not need to go down this route. I hope that he will withdraw the clause.

Paul Holmes: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Extraordinary rendition
After section 24B of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (c. 36) insert
24C Police powers to search aeroplanes
(1) If the Secretary of State has any reason to believe that an aircraft that is in flight over the United Kingdom is or has been or may be involved in an act of unlawful rendition then he or she may require the aircraft to land at a suitable aerodrome.
(2) If an aircraft is required to land in accordance with subsection (1), a responsible person must, as soon as practicable after the aircraft has landed, enter and search the aircraft.
(3) The Secretary of State or a responsible person must enter and search an aircraft if he or she has any reason to believe that
(a) an aircraft in an aerodrome is or has been or may be involved in an act of unlawful rendition; or
(b) in respect of an aircraft in an aerodrome, incomplete or incorrect information under sections 32 and 33 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (c. 13) has been supplied.
(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), a search of an aircraft is to be carried out to determine if
(a) the aircraft has been, or may be involved in an act of unlawful rendition,
(b) a criminal offence has been committed, or
(c) allowing the aircraft to continue on its journey could place the United Kingdom in breach of its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights,
but these powers may only be exercised when it is not reasonably practicable to apply for a warrant of entry in accordance with section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60).
(5) A person who carries out a search under this section may remove any items from the aircraft if it may be evidence of any of the matters set out in subsection (4).
(6) In this section
an act of unlawful rendition means an act, not being in accordance with formal lawful extradition or deportation procedures, involving the forcible transportation of a person to a territory where he or she may be subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment;
a responsible person means
(a) the chief officer of police of a police force maintained for a police area in England and Wales;
(b) the chief constable of a police force maintained under the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (c. 77);
(c) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;
(d) one of the Commissioners of Her Majestys Revenue and Customs;
(e) a constable designated by any of the persons specified in paragraphs (a) to (c)..
(Paul Holmes.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Paul Holmes: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would amend the Aviation Security Act 1982. It would introduce new powers to direct a plane crossing British airspace to land and be searched if it is suspected of involvement in unlawful rendition. Proposals on this issue were tabled to the Civil Aviation Bill and the Police and Justice Bill in 2006, but were unsuccessful. Given the acknowledgment since that time that planes transporting prisoners to countries where they faced torture and inhuman and degrading treatment have come within the UKs jurisdiction, it is appropriate to look at the matter again. Given that we debated the 1982 Act in earlier sittings, this Bill seemed to be the relevant place to raise the matter again.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to take this action if he or she thought that people were being unlawfully rendered in planes that cross British airspace. There is the side issue of planes that land to refuel on British territory, whether in this country or airbases like Diego Garcia. That discussion has been rehearsed on other occasions. It is unnecessary to go into the allegations that have been made or the admissions that this has happened in UK territory and airspace. The Government confirmed that our base on Diego Garcia had been used at least twice for flights involved in extraordinary rendition. We are not trying to reopen the argument about what has happened in the past.
Given the admissions that have been made, a line must be drawn and legislation should be amended so that the UK can take action to carry out its obligations under human rights legislation, international law and as a signatory to conventions on the use of torture. We should not by passive acquiescence be seen to condone such activity or to allow it to take place in areas under our jurisdiction.
The new clause is self-explanatory, so I leave it to others to respond.

James Brokenshire: I do not want to detain the Committee in relation to this new clause. Serious questions have been raised over the Governments involvement in extraordinary rendition. What activities may or may not have taken place must be considered further. The underlying issue is that information must be provided and assurances over future conduct given. More than anything, the new clause is intended to promote and provoke debate and consideration of these important issues. It also seeks to ensure that this country complies with international conventions and human rights legislation.
Given the hour and the time left to the Committee, I do not wish to embark upon a full-scale debate on extraordinary rendition. That would not be appropriate in the circumstances. However, we will continue to press the Government on this issue and to raise questions. I will listen with interest to the Ministers response.

Jim Fitzpatrick: It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr. Bayley. This issue was debated at length on a number of occasions when similar amendments were tabled on Report to both the Civil Aviation and the Police and Justice Bills in 2006, as the hon. Member for Chesterfield said.
The main thrust of the new clause is to give the Secretary of State a specific power to direct an aircraft overflying the UK to land and be searched if it is believed that it is involved in an act of unlawful rendition. However, the Chicago convention on international civil aviation already allows a state to require a civil aircraft to land if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that it is being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of that convention. I therefore suggest to the hon. Gentleman that the new clause is unnecessary.
As the hon. Member for Hornchurch suggested, I do not intend to go into the whole debate on extraordinary rendition, but I have to respond to the suggestions in the new clause. Before commenting in more detail, it might help if I briefly explain the current requirements regarding permission for foreign aircraft to land at UK airports and enter UK airspace. Aircraft registered outside the EU and the European economic area require the prior permission of the Secretary of State for Transport to operate commercial flights into the UK. A shorthand definition of a commercial flight is that fee-paying passengers or cargo are being picked up or dropped off. That definition applies equally to scheduled and charter flights. The obligation for operators of international commercial aircraft to seek permission to land is set out in articles 5 and 6 of the Chicago convention and reflected in UK legislation in article 138 of the Air Navigation Order 2005.
The Chicago convention also provides that flights operated on a private basis, that is flights for which payment has not been made to the operator for the carriage of passengers or cargo, may overfly contracting states and stop in them to refuel, or for other technical reasons, without prior permission. Again, that is in article 5 of the convention.
State aircraftthose used in military, customs and police servicesare required by article 3 of the convention to acquire the authorisation of the foreign state to overfly or land. In the UK, that is a matter for either the Secretary of State for Defence or the Foreign Secretary. The procedures required for the authorisation of state aircraft entering UK airspace or landing on UK territory are set out in the diplomatic flight clearance procedure, which is derived from article 3 of the convention. Clearance under those procedures does not provide any immunity against breaches of national or international law or regulations, or authorise the aircraft, its crew or passengers to act in such a way that leads the UK to breach its international obligations.
The right to fly over UK airspace without landing is given to scheduled international air services by article 1 of the international air services transit agreementa sister agreement to the Chicago conventionand prior permission is therefore not required. A right of overflight for non-scheduled air services is granted by article 5 of the Chicago convention, but is subject to the overflown states right to require the aircraft to land.
The proposed new clause seeks to introduce an amendment to the Aviation Security Act 1982 that would provide the Secretary of State with a specific power to direct an aircraft in UK airspace to land. Further, it would provide a power to search that aircraft or any other aircraft already in the UK when there was any reason to believe that incorrect information had been given under section 32 or 33 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, or that the aircraft in question was, had been, or might in the future be, involved in acts of unlawful rendition.
One of the practical problems with the new clause is that it does not specify the level of suspicion required to trigger a direction from the Secretary of State that an aircraft must land. That could mean that any allegation, whether or not supported by credible evidence, would be sufficient to allow the Secretary of State to issue such a direction. While I recognise that the purpose of the amendment is to address a very serious issue and that there are difficulties in establishing evidence that an unlawful rendition is taking place in sufficient time to act upon it, directing an aircraft to land is a significant step and accordingly any such direction should be based at least upon a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.
A further practical problem with the new clause is that it would allow the entry and search of any aircraft that there is reason to believe has been or may be used for unlawful rendition. Allegations of past misdeeds, whether proven or not, are no evidence that acts of unlawful rendition are taking place on a current flight. Further, all aircraft have the potential to be used for unlawful rendition and, taken literally, the new clause would require every aircraft landing in the UK to be searched. I certainly do not think that is the intention of the hon. Gentleman.

Paul Holmes: Obviously, we are talking about the discretion of the Secretary of State, who would not apply it to every plane that flew over. So far the Minister has confined his comments to civil aircraft and argued that existing legislation covers that. These provisions would apply to the military as well.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I am happy that the hon. Gentleman has raised that point, as I am just coming to it.
The new clause provides no discretion when it comes to the entry and search of an aircraft directed to land or already on the ground in the UK if there is any reason to suspect past, present or future involvement in unlawful rendition. Once such a reason had been established, there would be an obligation on responsible persons to search the aircraft every time it landed in the UK in future, regardless of any change of ownership, unless or until it had been established that the aircraft was not, nor had ever been, involved in such operations. In the absence of any distinction being drawn between state and non-state aircraft, that has the potential to raise particular difficulties, especially regarding military aircraft of the armed forces of visiting states.
Crucially, however, as I mentioned earlier, the new clause is unnecessary as article 3bis of the Chicago convention already allows a state to require civil aircraft to land if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that it is being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the convention. An act of unlawful rendition may well fall within such a definition. We would nevertheless need to be very sure of our intelligence before taking such a step. Furthermore, the police have the power to search premises, including an aircraft, under warrant. Applications for a warrant are made under section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. A search warrant will be granted where a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed, that there is relevant, admissible evidence on the premises and that one of the conditions in section 8(3) is satisfied. We believe that these powers could be used in a case in which an aircraft had been required to land under the Chicago convention, but there would have to be sufficient information to satisfy the court that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting an indictable offence had been committed.
As can be seen, sufficient powers are already in place under existing legislation to take action of the sort envisaged by this new clause, based on reasonable suspicion. This view is supported by the Intelligence and Security Committees report into rendition, which stated:
We are satisfied that, where there is sufficient evidence of unlawful activity on board an aircraft in UK airspace, be it a rendition operation or otherwise, this would be investigated by the UK authorities.
While we will continue to keep these powers under review, the proposed new clause is simply unnecessary. I therefore call on the hon. Member for Chesterfield not to press his new clause.

Paul Holmes: A number of issues arise following what the Minister has said. The suggestion is that the legislation adequately covers civil aircraft, but there are doubts about parts of it. The Terrorism Act 2002, for example, gives
police, immigration and HM Customs and Excise the power to serve on the owner or agents of an aircraft arriving in the UK a notice requiring details of the crew and passengers, but this is limited to cases involving terrorism.
That is limited to terrorism. There are other possible ramifications which might not be covered by that provision, so the legislation is not all-embracing. It applies only to civil aircraft. Unless I missed it, the Minister did not go on to talk about military aspects. What is new since the attempts to amend previous legislation in 2006 is that we have had quite a humiliating climbdown by the Foreign Secretary, who has twice had to admit that he unwittingly misled the House because he had taken on good faith what the US Government had told him.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I did say state aircraft, and obviously that covers military as opposed to civilian aircraft, which formed the main content of my remarks.

Paul Holmes: I thank the Minister.

David Ruffley: Is it the hon. Gentlemans guess that military might include the CIA?

Paul Holmes: If it is state aircraft it would embrace everythingcivil, military, specialist CIA flights. We all know the old example of the famous Air America flights that operated in south-east Asia in the Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos wars, so the definition covers the whole range.

Debate interrupted (Programme Order, 27 January and 24 February).

The Chairman put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83D), That the clause be read a Second time.

Question accordingly negatived.

The Chairman then put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).

New Schedule 2

Injunctions: Powers to Remand

Introductory
1 (1) The provisions of this Schedule apply where the court has power to remand a person under section [Arrest without warrant](5) or [Issue of warrant of arrest](4).
(2) In this Schedule, the court means the High Court or a county court and includes
(a) in relation to the High Court, a judge of that court, and
(b) in relation to a county court, a judge or district judge of that court.

Remand in custody or on bail
2 (1) The court may
(a) remand the person in custody, that is, commit the person to custody to be brought before the court at the end of the period of remand or at such earlier time as the court may require, or
(b) remand the person on bail.
(2) The court may remand the person on bail
(a) by taking from the person a recognizance, with or without sureties, conditioned as provided in paragraph 3, or
(b) by fixing the amount of the recognizances with a view to their being taken subsequently and, in the meantime, committing the person to custody as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
(3) Where a person is brought before the court after remand, the court may further remand the person.
3 (1) Where a person is remanded on bail, the court may direct that the persons recognizance be conditioned for the persons appearance
(a) before that court at the end of the period of remand, or
(b) at every time and place to which during the course of the proceedings the hearing may from time to time be adjourned.
(2) Where a recognizance is conditioned for a person's appearance as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b), the fixing of any time for the person next to appear is to be treated as a remand.
(3) Nothing in this paragraph affects the power of the court at any subsequent hearing to remand the person afresh.
4 (1) The court may not remand a person for a period exceeding 8 clear days unless
(a) the person is remanded on bail, and
(b) both that person and the person who applied for the injunction consent to a longer period.
(2) Where the court has power to remand a person in custody it may, if the remand is for a period not exceeding 3 clear days, commit the person to the custody of a constable.

Further remand
5 (1) If the court is satisfied that a person who has been remanded is unable by reason of illness or accident to appear or be brought before the court at the expiration of the period of remand, the court may, in the absence of the person, further remand the person.
(2) The power mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) may, in the case of a person who was remanded on bail, be exercised by enlarging the persons recognizance and those of any sureties for the person to a later time.
(3) Where a person remanded on bail is bound to appear before the court at any time and the court has no power to remand the person under sub-paragraph (1), the court may (in the persons absence) enlarge the persons recognizance and those of any sureties for the person to a later time.
(4) The enlargement of the persons recognizance is to be treated as a further remand.
(5) Paragraph 4(1) (limit of remand) does not apply to the exercise of the powers conferred by this paragraph.

Postponement of taking recognizance
6 Where under paragraph 2(2)(b) the court fixes the amount in which the principal and the sureties, if any, are to be bound, the recognizance may afterwards be taken by such person as may be prescribed by rules of court, with the same consequences as if it had been entered into before the court.

Requirements imposed on remand on bail
7 The court may when remanding a person on bail under this Schedule require the person to comply, before release on bail or later, with such requirements as appear to the court to be necessary to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice..(Mr. Coaker.)

Brought up, and added to the Bill.

Title

Amendment made: 307, in title, line 6, after 2006 insert
and the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups (Northern Ireland) Order 2007.(Mr. Coaker.)

This amendment is consequential on amendments 38, 40, and 42.

Ordered,
That certain written evidence already reported to the House be appended to the proceedings of the Committee.(Mr. Coaker.)

Vernon Coaker: On a point of order, Mr. Bayley, I know that everybody wishes to get away, but may I take a minute or two to thank people? This has been an extremely good Committee and the quality of debate has generally been very good. Sometimes, when debate is good-natured, even when there is disagreement, it helps the world go round, and this has been a good Committee from that point of view.
I thank the doorkeepers, the police, the staff of the House, the Clerks and the Hansard reporters for their efforts with the Bills delivery. I also thank my officials and my office for putting various briefings together for me and for helping me understand, as I have told members of the Committee, the issue of extradition, which I find difficult. I know that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon loves it, but it is a bit of a trial for the rest of us.
Thank you, Mr. Bayley, for your chairmanship, and pass on my thanks to your co-Chairman, Sir Nicholas. I thank my fellow Ministers, my hon. Friends the Members for Tynemouth and for Poplar and Canning Town, for their support and assistance with the Bill. The contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Canning Town was a long time coming, but it was worth waiting for, and I appreciate it. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, North for his role as the Government Whip on the Committee and the way in which he conducted his work. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sedgefield, who is sitting behind me. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North made the point[Interruption.] I am going to refer to her, because I do not want to miss anyone out[Interruption.] Do not worry, I will mention others too. I wish to thank my hon. Friend, because she pointed outI am familiar with this from my time on the Back Benchesthat Ministers tend to thank everyone apart from their Back Benchers. I used to sit there fuming about that, and actually took the matter up with one or two Ministers. That made me determined not to do it if I found myself in their position. May I therefore thank my hon. Friends the Members for City of Durham, for Brigg and Goole, for Northampton, North and for Stourbridge? They are not here, but I thank them for their help.
I thank the hon. Members for Hornchurch and for Bury St. Edmunds[Interruption.] I have thanked my hon. Friend the Member for City of Durham, but I am grateful for the reminder. I thank the Opposition spokesmen for the way in which they conducted the debate. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds once said to me, when talking about the Committee, that they would not mess about. That is an extremely reasonable statement and I hope he does not mind me saying that in front of peopleit is an extremely appropriate attitude. The hon. Member for Hornchurch and I have spent many an hourmany a week and many a month, it seemson Bills of various sorts, and I appreciate the way in which he and his colleague conducted themselves, with the support of their Back Benchers. It has been a pleasure to have them here as well.
Before I move on from the Opposition, I thank the hon. Member for West Chelmsford. I would like to say formally, on the record that, although it is inappropriate to mention a couple of thingsand I mean this in all seriousnesssome difficult arrangements have had to be made between him and my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, North. If it had not been for his co-operation and help we would have had, through nobodys fault, some very real difficulty. It is a great tribute to him that he has not tried to mess about. He has recognised the serious situation a couple of my hon. Friends were in and I thank him very much for his co-operation and help, without which it would have been extremely difficultI just put that on the record.
I thank, too, the hon. Members for Chesterfield and for Oxford, West and Abingdon for their contributions. The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon and I often debate human rights issues of one sort or another, and I try to take them into account. I thank the hon. Member for Chesterfield, too, for his contributions to the debate. I think that I have thanked everyone. Auntie Sylvia or Uncle Frank will appear somewhere, Mr. Bayley. [Interruption.] We will bring that forward in an order-making power by affirmative resolution! To be serious, I have enjoyed the Committee: it has been an excellent Committee. and I thank everyone who has contributed to our deliberations.

Hugh Bayley: That was not really a point of order.

David Ruffley: Further to that point of order, I thought that when the Minister stood up, he was going to have a Kate Winslet moment. If I may be permitted to extend the analogy, his was a very great performance. There should be an Oscar for the scriptwriters on both sides. The Minister made a very good point: he relied on, or got support and advice from, his officials who, from what I have seen in the Committee, are extremely dedicated, professional and thorough, and they should be congratulated.
The advisers and supporters on this side should also be congratulatedthose who assist me, my excellent and eloquent hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch and, of course, the Back Bench support from my irreplaceable hon. Friends the Members for Mid-Bedfordshire and for Bromsgrove. To pursue the analogy, we do not need scriptwriters all the time, because what was evident from the debateso far as the contributions from the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the Minister, and from Conservative Members were concernedwas that there was a bit of thinking on ones feet, a bit of debate and a bit of exploring what the issues were all about without relying on the textbook answers. That is why my scriptwriting Oscar analogy is, on reflection, probably inappropriate. This has been a very good-natured, but also serious-minded, debate on a raft of issues. The Minister referred to a conversation that we had before this debate, so I shall repay him in kind by referring to one that we had in the first week or so of our proceedings. He passed on intelligence to me that those who have been following our proceedingsnot only those in the police service, but the wider policing family and those supporting ithave remarked on the fact that this has been a grown-up debate.
Where necessary, we have disagreed on ideological, party-political lines. However, we have also found common centre ground where non-ideological issues have been at stake and where the Minister and Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members just wanted to find the best answerthat is to say, the best form of words and law that the Committee could produce to assist the police service of this country. I want to end on that note. At the end of the day, the Committee has been trying to achieve a safer country, a better criminal justice system and more effective law and order. Without those things, nothing else can really happen in this country.

Hugh Bayley: On behalf of Sir Nicholas and myself, I thank hon. Members for their kind remarks. In particular, I thank Mr. Kennon and Mr. Shaw, the Clerks of the Committee, without whom I would have been completely at sea and the Committee would have been an utter mess. I thank them for their support. I also thank the Hansard writers for producing a record of our proceedings, which is important. I agree that our proceedings have been serious with some extremely good debates and some serious questions to be resolved; they were resolved with good humour and a very high quality of debate. It has been a real pleasure for me to sit in the Chair. I have learned much from Members on both sides of the House, and I thank them.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Committee rose.